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ABSTRACT 
 
Bayesian Network Analysis of Nuclear Acquisitions. 
 (August 2008) 
Corey Ross Freeman, B.S., Texas A&M University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. William S. Charlton 
 
Nuclear weapons proliferation produces a vehement global safety and security 
concern.  Perhaps most threatening is the scenario of a rogue nation or a terrorist 
organization acquiring nuclear weapons where the conventional ideas of nuclear 
deterrence may not apply.  To combat this threat, innovative tools are needed that will 
help to improve understanding of the pathways an organization will take in attempting to 
obtain nuclear weapons and in predicting those pathways based on existing evidence. In 
this work, a methodology was developed for predicting these pathways. This 
methodology uses a Bayesian network.  An organization’s motivations and key 
resources are evaluated to produce the prior probability distributions for various 
pathways.  These probability distributions are updated as evidence is added.  The 
methodology is implemented through the use of the commercially available Bayesian 
network software package, Netica.   
A few simple scenarios are considered to show that the model’s predictions agree 
with intuition.  These scenarios are also used to explore the model’s strengths and 
limitations. The model provides a means to measure the relative threat that an 
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organization poses to nuclear proliferation and can identify potential pathways that an 
organization will likely pursue.  Thus, the model can serve to facilitate preventative 
efforts in nuclear proliferation.  The model shows that an organization’s motivations 
biased the various pathways more than their resources; however, resources had a greater 
impact on an organization’s overall chance of success.  Limitations of this model are that 
(1) it can not account for deception, (2) it can not account for parallel weapon programs, 
and (3) the accuracy of the output can only be as good as the user input. This work 
developed the first, published, quantitative methodology for predicting nuclear 
proliferation with consideration for how an organization’s motivations impact their 
pathway probabilities. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION  
Terrorism will remain a grave concern for humanity throughout the twenty first 
century.1,2  This concern was highlighted by the September 11th attacks where terrorist 
groups demonstrated their resourcefulness and adaptability.  Organizations such as Al’ 
Qaeda openly encourage any attack against American interest and are equally vocal in 
their desire to obtain nuclear weapons.  The idea of nuclear armed terrorists shifts the 
threat to national security from states to both state and non-state entities.  Fortunately, 
the pathway to constructing a nuclear weapon is seemingly impossible to a terrorist 
organization that lacks key infrastructures and technologies that developed nations 
possess.   However, this obstacle can be circumvented by endorsement from a rogue 
nation with nuclear capabilities, or just a person in a key position who is sympathetic to 
their goals.3  As a result, addressing the problem of nuclear terrorism requires preventing 
nuclear proliferation on every front.  Tools are needed that can identify particular threats 
to nuclear proliferation, whether it is a terrorist organization or a rogue nation, so that 
resources can be devoted to preventative efforts.4  Embodied in this work is a 
methodology for one such tool.  Using Bayesian probabilities and the motivations of a 
potential proliferator, conclusions are drawn about the likely pathway that would be 
taken to achieve their goal.  This information can then be used to identify any 
chokepoints or other key pieces that are critical to their success. 
 
                                                 
 This thesis follows the style of Nuclear Technology. 
  
2
Background 
The distinguishing characteristic between nuclear explosions and conventional 
explosions is their source of energy.  In conventional explosions chemical compounds 
change form, resulting in the reconfiguration of electrons.  The electrons in this new 
configuration are more tightly bound than before and this difference liberates energy.  In 
a nuclear explosion the protons and neutrons in the nucleus of atoms undertake some 
form of change which results in a more tightly bound nucleus.  Just as in the case of the 
electrons in the conventional explosion, results in liberated energy as well.  The energy 
that is liberated due to nuclear transformations is typically millions of times greater than 
that from electron transformations.  Thus, nuclear explosions have the potential for 
liberating millions of times more energy than conventional explosions.  Not all chemical 
compounds can undergo a reaction that releases significant amounts of energy in a short 
time frame, and fortunately, the same is true for nuclear reactions as well.  Only certain 
isotopes of a few elements can be manipulated into releasing energy quick enough to 
cause an explosion. 
There are two fundamental ways to release energy in a nuclear explosion: fusion 
and fission.  Fusion involves overcoming the columbic barrier from the protons in two 
small nuclei and melding them together forming one new larger nucleus and releasing 
energy.  Fission is the process of a heavier nucleus splitting into separate smaller nuclei, 
resulting in the release of energy along with a few neutrons.  Isotopes for fission 
weapons are able to absorb a thermal neutron and subsequently fission and are called 
fissile.  Both of the bombs used by the U. S. on Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World 
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War II were fission bombs.  Creating fusion weapons, commonly called thermonuclear 
weapons, pose significantly more technical difficulties but have the potential to be 
hundreds of times more powerful than fission devices. 
Historically no nuclear weapon program has created a fusion weapon as their 
first device.  This is due to technological hurtles along with the fact that a small fission 
weapon is needed to produce the energy necessary to start the fusion process.  So from 
the standpoint of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, the short list of material 
usable for this purpose may be confined to those that are used for fission based weapons, 
uranium and plutonium, which are commonly referred to as Special Nuclear Materials 
(SNM).5  The definition of SNM currently encompasses plutonium and uranium with the 
isotopes of uranium-233 (U-233) or uranium-235 (U-235) being enriched to greater than 
twenty percent. 
 
Materials for Nuclear Weapons 
Uranium is contained in soils all over the world.  Concentrations vary with 
geological formations; but across the earth, uranium’s abundance is approximately two 
grams per ton of soil and deposits can be found that vary in grade from 0.03% to 0.5%.6  
The naturally occurring uranium that is mined out of the ground contains primarily three 
isotopes, uranium-234 (U-234), U-235, and uranium-238 (U-238).  Out of these three 
isotopes only U-235 is fissile and comprises approximately 0.72% of natural uranium.  
To make the uranium usable in a nuclear weapon, the fraction of U-235 must be raised 
higher than 20%, known as Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU).  It is generally preferable 
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if the uranium is enriched to approximately 90% for nuclear explosives which is referred 
to as Weapons Grade Uranium (WgU).  Enriching uranium is an expensive and time 
consuming process.  Weapons-grade uranium described above is commonly referred to 
as Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU). 
During the Manhattan Project several methods to enrich Uranium were 
considered including gaseous diffusion, gaseous centrifuge, and Electro-Magnetic 
Isotope Separation (EMIS).  The enrichment method used by both Brazil and South 
Africa was aerodynamic isotope separation.  Another potential option is to use tunable 
lasers to enrich uranium.  Laser enrichment is still largely in the developmental stage.  
For greater detail of how each of the different enrichment processes work, Wilson’s text 
is suggested.7 
The other fissile material of concern, plutonium, does not occur naturally.  
Plutonium is produced in a nuclear reactor by irradiating uranium fuel, particularly U-
238, with neutrons.  When U-238 absorbs a neutron it becomes U-239.  It will then 
decay via two successive β- transitions and becomes Pu-239.  While in the reactor the 
Pu-239 is also being irradiated with neutrons and may absorb one or two of them, 
becoming Pu-240 and Pu-241 respectively.  Pu-240 and Pu-241 have undesirable 
properties from a nuclear weapons standpoint, and as a result Weapons Grade Plutonium 
(WgPu) is made from mostly Pu-239.  The plutonium that is in the reactor after longer 
periods of operation is called Reactor Grade Plutonium (RgPu).  It contains higher 
concentrations of Pu-240 and Pu-241, and is more complicated to use for the production 
of nuclear weapons.8 
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The plutonium in the spent fuel is extracted via chemical separation (referred to 
as reprocessing).  Reprocessing spent fuel is a difficult process.  The irradiated fuel is 
extremely radioactive, requiring remote handling.  The first step in reprocessing is to 
remove the cladding, usually by chopping the fuel into pieces and dissolving away the 
fuel.  Then, the uranium and plutonium are chemically separated from the fission 
products and transuranic elements.  Finally, a solvent is used that reduces plutonium to 
an organic-insoluble state to extract it from the uranium.  For more information about 
reprocessing Wilson is again suggested as well as Benedict, Pigford, and Levi.7,9   
HEU and plutonium are the two choices to consider when developing a fission 
weapon.  While there are other materials that are suitable for the task, getting these 
materials involves the same steps as reprocessing plutonium but so little of the material 
is acquired that it becomes a much less feasible option. 
Although it is a difficult task, many nations already have the capabilities above 
as part of their domestic nuclear energy infrastructure.  Thus, this technology could be 
made available to a proliferator.  The field of nuclear nonproliferation focuses on 
preventing the spread of technology and the materials needed for the development and 
production of nuclear weapons. 
 
Theories of Proliferation 
Nonproliferation policy theory has been dominated by the “realist” point of 
view.10  The realist point of view is that nuclear weapons, like any new war technology, 
are valuable to nations and a must for national security.  Therefore, only strong supply-
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side control measures can stop the world’s natural tendency toward rampant nuclear 
proliferation.  However, traditionally the realist view has not been overly successful in 
appraising the realities of nuclear proliferation.  This is highlighted by President J. F. 
Kennedy who in the early 1960s predicted by the end of the decade 15 or 20 nations 
would have nuclear weapons.11  The realist’s line of reasoning consistently predicts a 
nuclear armed world but always fall short.  In fact only about 1/5 of the states that could 
have built nuclear weapons have chosen to do so.12  There have even been nations that 
after obtaining nuclear weapons have dismantled or otherwise removed them (Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, South Africa, and the Ukraine).  Clearly supply-side control measures are 
not the only force at work preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. 
As a result of this failure to explain the current state of proliferation, more 
thought has been given recently to the “idealist” reasoning on nuclear proliferation.10  
The idealist point of view looks at the demand side of nuclear proliferation to explain 
this discrepancy.   It points out the import role that the motivations of an individual 
leader, the people of the state, and the international community as a whole play in 
whether a nuclear weapons program should be pursued. 
The supply-side view of the situation points out that in general the world will 
head down the path of nuclear proliferation.  The idealist method of looking at individual 
entities for explanation comes about because nuclear proliferation does not happen in 
general, it happens in specific.13  Specific countries proliferate, specific global and 
regional circumstances trigger proliferation, and specific people and organizations 
decide to proliferate.  This does not mean that the commonly held realist view of the past 
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should be discarded.  Keeping tight control on the technologies and materials that are 
necessary for a nuclear weapons program places obstacles in the way that at a minimum 
buys time for the situation that motivates nuclear proliferation to change. 
A recent study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in 
Washington D.C. examined eight countries that have publicly renounced nuclear 
weapons (Egypt, Germany, Japan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Syria, Taiwan, and 
Turkey).14  Looking at these countries individually in an idealist manner CSIS found that 
the principle factor that might prompt these countries to reexamine their choice is a 
dramatically increased security threat.  Such a security concern is imaginable if, for 
instance, a regional neighbor suddenly was in possession of nuclear weapons.  For 
example, in the Middle East it is believed that none of the Gulf States are interested in 
launching a weapons program because they rely on the U.S. for security.  However, if 
Iran manages to build a nuclear bomb, then it is very possible that Saudi Arabia will no 
longer feel U.S. protection is adequate.15  If Saudi Arabia has nuclear weapons, suddenly 
their neighbors may feel unsafe.  This makes it clear how the problem of nuclear 
proliferation may still follow the predicted path of the realist.  The conclusion that can 
be drawn is that while it is important to control the supply side of nuclear proliferation, 
examining the demand side, the motivational factors on a case-by-case bases, may also 
reveal ways to dissuade individual states from seeking nuclear weapons.  
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Efforts to Prevent Nuclear Proliferation 
There are and have been many efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.  
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) seeks to promote the use of nuclear 
energy for peaceful purposes as well as constraining the use of nuclear energy for 
military purposes.  The IAEA was established under the U.N. mission as an autonomous 
organization in 1957.  One of its functions is that it serves to verify that nations are 
meeting their obligations to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).  The aim of the 
NPT is to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and lead toward nuclear disarmament. 
The success of the NPT is encouraging.  Every country on Earth except for three 
have signed the treaty.  The NPT provides a system to verify that states are not covertly 
producing nuclear weapons.  Since the NPT went into effect in 1970, the number of 
states assumed to have nuclear weapons has increased from five [United States, Russia 
(former Soviet Union), United Kingdom, France, China] to nine.  Three of the four states 
that have developed weapons during that time (India, Pakistan, and Israel) never agreed 
to sign the NPT in the first place.  The fourth state (DPRK) signed the NPT in 1994, but 
withdrew in 2002 under suspicion of a covert nuclear weapons program.  Despite the 
DPRK case, adherence to the NPT is considered to be an international norm.  Thus any 
new nuclear weapons programs will be covert programs. 
These new nuclear armed states may not be affected by the deterrence strategy 
that dominated the Cold War.  These rogue states (e.g. North Korea) may feel pressured 
into using nuclear weapons first or are simply indifferent to the consequences of their 
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actions.  Nations led with such a mentality pose a particularly difficult challenge to 
preventing nuclear war. 
Additionally, terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons may completely bypass the 
deterrence strategy since they have no “return address”.  Terrorist organizations such as 
Al’ Qaeda openly confess their desire to obtain nuclear weapons, show their hatred 
toward America and other Western cultures through both words and actions, and have 
demonstrated their resourcefulness in the attacks carried out in 2001.  To further 
compound the problem rogue states (and some sub-elements of those states) are often 
accused of sponsoring terrorism.  The challenge of obtaining SNM may be beyond the 
abilities of a terrorist group, but help from a rogue nation with nuclear capabilities 
sharing a common goal could allow this challenge to be circumvented.   
Preventing rogue states and terrorist organizations from obtaining nuclear 
weapons is a particularly complex problem that faces our generation.  This work 
addresses one component of this problem:  considering the idealist model and the 
demand side of why an individual, organization, or nation may choose to proliferate, 
what conclusions may be drawn regarding the pathway they will take in their endeavor?  
Realizing the merit of the realist viewpoint, the conclusions drawn should be 
supplemented with any knowledge of evidence regarding their choice to proliferate.  In 
this work, a methodology is developed that makes predictions to what pathway an 
organization of interest (be it a state or sub-state entity) will take in developing nuclear 
weapons.  The methodology first predicts a path based on the motivational factors that 
affect the organization of interest.  This prediction can then be modified by adding any 
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evidence regarding nuclear proliferation that is known or later found about the 
organization of interest.  The methodology can then be used not only to predict an 
organization’s pathway but to measure the effect that different evidence has on the 
choices they make and overall success, allowing the determination of possible choke 
points along the way that may be used to hinder or all together prevent nuclear 
proliferation. 
 
Previous Work 
In July of 2006, the Center for Contemporary Conflict held a conference in 
California to discuss the threats to nuclear proliferation over the next ten to fifteen 
years.16  This conference hosted over sixty government officials, military officers, 
scholars, and non-governmental experts and discussed factors that would most likely 
influence the nuclear proliferation landscape in the timeframe of 2016.  From the list of 
significant findings by the conference, several are relevant to the development of this 
work and are discussed by Ford.17  Of particular interest is the following factor:16 
 
• Decisions to go nuclear are made by individuals, so understanding the 
psychological mindsets of individual leaders is crucial to nonproliferation 
efforts. Leaders of a country typically make the ultimate decision to start a 
nuclear program and continue to make or test an actual bomb. Based on historical 
experience, those leaders can on occasion be persuaded not to pursue nuclear 
weapons, especially when fellow heads of state make pointed appeals. 
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This finding supports the growing idealist view on nuclear proliferation.  
Understanding the motivations and driving force behind the leader, or leaders, of a 
nation is essential to evaluating the potential risk they pose.  Hyman has recently 
published work that attempts to do just that.12  Hyman defines two dimensions that are 
rated: solidarity and status.  Solidarity measures how they see their role in the 
international setting.  Do they see it as an “us and them” community or an “us versus 
them” community?  The status dimension measures how a nation feels they rank in this 
community. Do they feel that they “are equals if not superior” or they “are naturally 
inferior”?  By examining a nation’s leader and looking at what quadrant of these two 
dimensions their view of their nation falls, Hyman makes conclusions about the 
likelihood of various things regarding the nation, such as whether they are likely to 
desire nuclear weapons, likely to resist the nonproliferation regime, and whether 
superpower nuclear guarantees will appeal to them. 
So far, security concerns have been the only motivation discussed but there are 
many reasons why a nation may choose to proliferate.  In fact, there is no shortage of 
literature on the subject.18,19,20  Several sources discuss the demand side of proliferation, 
which is the varying motivating factors that potential states may have.  Meyer 
conveniently lists a compilation of these discussions.21  But as mentioned before, nations 
are not the only concern to nuclear proliferation.  Both state and non-state actors pose a 
potential threat.  Insights regarding general motivations for a terrorist group to 
proliferate can also be found in the literature.22  The motivational factors that apply to an 
organization of interest, be it state or non-state, not only give insights into what possible 
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options may be present to persuade them not to pursue nuclear weapons but also play a 
role in determining the potential pathway towards nuclear development they choose.  As 
a result, the motivation of an organization is an important aspect of the methodology 
developed here.   
After the motivations are considered, the next step is to consider the pathway that 
an organization of interest may take toward a nuclear capacity.  The steps taken by the 
first eight nations that developed nuclear weapons have all been fundamentally the same: 
acquire fissile materials capabilities, produce SNM, and build a functioning weapon as 
fast as possible.  Now, however, any nation pursuing nuclear weapons would be in 
violation of the NPT and so any efforts would most likely be less straight forward and 
open.  Einhorn points out that any aspiring nuclear weapon states would use a more 
cautious, incremental and ambiguous course.13  These pathways to proliferation may 
take on one or some combination of the following forms: hedging, settling for less, 
maintaining ambiguity, and relying on dual-use facilities. 
The Director General of the IAEA, Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei has said that failure 
to control nuclear material may be the Achilles’ heel of the nuclear nonproliferation 
regime.23  This is what makes dual use facilities such a threat to proliferation.  Under the 
NPT any nation has the right to construct these facilities for civilian purposes, but once 
the capability is in place, the supply side restraints of nuclear proliferation disappear.  
Efforts to combat this issue have lead to the development of civil reactor designs that 
incorporate increasing sophisticated proliferation resistance techniques.24  Other efforts 
have gone into creating tools that assist the IAEA with evaluating the data collected 
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from integrated safeguards to identify signatures of covert activities.25  Strengthening the 
supply side of proliferation is extremely beneficial, however, there are other pathways 
that can be taken and so it will not serve as a complete solution. 
Determining quantitatively which pathway a rogue nation or terrorist 
organization will take to acquire a nuclear weapon requires the use of some method of 
decision-making analysis.  Decision-making analyses are used in a plethora of fields and 
as a result there is plenty of literature on the subject.26,27,28,29  These methods range from 
Decision Trees, Monte Carlo, Cost-Benefit Analysis, Multi Attribute-Utility Analysis 
(MAUA) and everything in between.  There is also a multitude of commercially 
available software packages designed to facility a decision maker by simplifying the use 
of these methods.  The large variety of choices available when examining decision 
analysis tools stems from the fact that modeling human behavior is extremely complex 
and no one method can cover all of its facets. 
Few attempts have been made to apply a statistical analysis to the field of nuclear 
nonproliferation.  One example done by Meyer in 1984 examines several countries over 
the prior decades to make near and far term forecast for potential proliferators.21  
Meyers’ analysis includes many variables such as a nation’s propensity to proliferate, 
their technical capabilities, and lag time associated with how long it would take before a 
nation could achieve its goal of nuclear weapons.  The downside to Meyers work is that 
it does not include the dynamic of non-state organizations’ threat to nuclear 
proliferation. 
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Another study examined the effect that specific determinants had on a nation’s 
tendency to proliferate.30  This study makes the distinction between the two stages of 
proliferation, having a weapons program and actually acquiring a nuclear weapon.  The 
study found that security concerns and technological capabilities were key determinants 
in explaining the presence of a nuclear weapons program, but the key determinants in 
whether a nation possessed a weapon were security concerns, economic strength, and 
domestic politics.  The work recognized that theft or purchase were possible pathways to 
obtaining a nuclear weapon but since to date this has not occurred, addressing this 
avenue was impossible in their empirical method. 
In 2007, a code was developed that examined different pathways that a terrorist 
organization might take in an attempt to acquire SNM.17  The code was Monte Carlo 
based and the probabilities centered around the resources that the terrorist organization 
of interest was assumed to possess.  This analysis based on resources is a good supply-
side model for predicting the pathways that a terrorist group might use.  Unfortunately, it 
is lacking any demand-side capabilities.  The motivation that an organization has to 
develop a nuclear weapon does influence the pathway they may use.  
One final example of related work examined here is a Bayesian analysis of the 
different pathways a terrorist group may take to develop an Improvised Nuclear Device 
(IND).31  While the model had a robust representation of various pathways, it lacked any 
thorough or consistent manner for handling resources or motivations.  That being said, 
the IND pathway model showcased some of the benefits that Bayesian methods offer, 
but could be improved by incorporating these other characteristics. 
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The following work focuses on the demand side of proliferation.  It considers an 
organization’s motivations to proliferate and uses a Bayesian analysis to quantify the 
likelihood of different pathways and the overall chance of success.  This information 
may be used as a means to determine the relative threat that different organizations pose.  
Furthermore, insights gained into which pathways are most likely may be used to 
determine chokepoints in a proliferator’s efforts.  Thus, measures can be taken to prevent 
the proliferation from occurring. 
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CHAPTER II 
NETWORK DEVELOPMENT 
Bayes’ Theorem 
Bayesian probabilities began with the English mathematician Reverend Thomas 
Bayes whose discovery of the theorem that now bears his name was published 
posthumously.32  Bayes’ Theorem is simply a manner to calculate probability of one 
event occurring based on whether another event has occurred.  Suppose that both A  and 
B  are events, and that ( )P A  and ( )P B  represent the probability that events A  and B  
occurred respectively.  Then Bayes’ Theorem is as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
P B A P A
P A B
P B
=  (1) 
Where ( )P A B  is the probability that event A  occurs given that event B  did occur, and 
( )P A B  represents the probability that event B  occurs given that A   occurred. 
If an event is not affected by the occurrence of other events then it will have a 
subjectively defined probability distribution.  Or if the event is in some manner affected 
by any other events, then its probability distribution is governed by the truth of these 
events using Bayes’ Theorem.  The probability distributions that exist before any 
evidence is added are known as the priors.  By linking all of the events together that 
affect each other, a Bayesian Network, or a Belief Network is created.  When you discover 
“evidence” about the probability that certain events have occurred, Bayes’ Theorem 
calculates the probability that other events in the network have occurred.  In this manner 
Bayesian Networks calculate probabilities based not only on the priors, but on known 
evidence as well.33 
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Bayes’ Theorem is the only consistent way to modify our beliefs about events 
given the evidence about what has actually occurred.34  This highlights one of the 
strengths of Bayesian probabilities over other statistical methods, the inferences made are 
based on the actual occurring data, not on all possible data sets that might have occurred 
but didn’t.  As a result, once created, Bayesian networks are powerful tools that can be 
used to make predictions based on the pieces of evidence that are known.  One caveat 
that should be addressed here is that, like all decision making analysis tools, the 
predictions and conclusions drawn are based on the user input.  Therefore, the value of 
the output is only as reliable as the accuracy of the input.  Bayesian Networks are no 
exception to this. 
 
Netica 
Bayesian Networks allow quantitative predictions based on the present state of 
information.  There are many commercially available software packages that are designed 
to facilitate the creation and use of Bayesian Networks.  The network created for this 
methodology takes advantage of one such package called Netica.35  Using Netica 
provides many advantages including a graphical interface, easy implementation of 
changes, and facilitating sensitivity analysis.  Therefore, the analyst can digest the big 
picture easily visualize how different nodes in the network are linked together.  This 
Bayesian Network is set up such that each node represents a piece of evidence or a step in 
some process.  These nodes are linked together by causal relationships as shown in Fig. 1.   
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Fig. 1. Example of a network in Netica 
In this example, nodes A and B impact the probability of node C and are called 
parents of node C.  The probability of each node being true is calculated using 
conditional probabilities.  The values needed to calculate the probability of each node are 
taken from truth tables that are defined for each node.  An example of a truth table in 
Netica is given in Fig. 2.  The truth table in Fig. 2 is used for node C from Fig. 1. 
 
Fig. 2. Example truth table in Netica 
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The conditional probability equation used to calculate the probability that node C 
is true is: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
, ,
, ,
T T T T T T T T F T F
T F T F T T F F F F
P C P C A B P A P B P C A B P A P B
P C A B P A P B P C A B P A P B
= +
+ +  (2) 
 where the subscripts T and F denote true and false respectively.  The truth table provides 
the probability for node C given each combination of nodes A and B.  The probabilities 
that are given to nodes A and B are subjectively defined priors. 
Truth tables require a value for each state a node has for every combination of 
states from its parent nodes.  These truth tables can be compiled “by hand” or through the 
use of an equation.  These equations can replace the task of entering thousands of rows of 
probabilities with writing a simple equation or a few lines of logic statements, making 
nodes with several inputs feasible.  In Fig. 3 the equation that was used to create the truth 
table from Fig. 2 can be seen.  It is important to keep in mind when dealing with these 
equations that they are not defining the relationship between the linked nodes; that is 
done with conditional probabilities and Bayes’ Theorem.  The equations only fill out the 
values that are needed in the truth tables. 
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Fig. 3. Example of using an equation to fill out the truth table in Netica 
Netica also allows the creation of constant nodes.  Constant nodes have no 
parents, and are not parents to any other node.  They can be supplied with a numerical 
value, or a list of choices that represent numerical values.  The constant nodes can then be 
called in equations that are used to fill out truth tables of other nodes throughout the 
network. 
Fig. 4 shows a simple example network before any evidence is added, when the 
probability of each node is its prior.  Once a network is compiled in Netica, clicking true 
on a node in Netica changes the probability of that node to 100% true and the node turns 
grey.  Using the truth tables, the probabilities of each node affected is calculated using 
Bayes’ Theorem and updated instantly.  This can be seen by observing the changed 
values of the nodes between Fig. 4 to Fig. 5.  Particularly notice the nodes Pathway 1 and 
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Likely Pathway.  By adding evidence associated with Pathway 1 in Fig. 5, the reader will 
notice that the probability that the node Pathway 1 is true increased significantly, along 
with its respective value in the node Likely Pathway.  The increase in probability of 
Pathway 1 was dictated by the values that the user defined in its truth table.  It is 
important to note that the user could make it so that the probability would decrease as 
certain evidence was added.  This may be used to account for evidence that suggest that 
Pathway 1 is not a likely pathway. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Example of Bayesian network in Netica with priors 
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Fig. 5. Example of Bayesian network in Netica after adding evidence 
Netica can also facilitate a sensitivity analyses.  At any point after a network is 
created, Netica can calculate the relative ability of different nodes to impact the truth of a 
node of interest.  Netica takes into account any evidence already entered when making 
this calculation.  This useful feature has many applications.  For example, by examining 
certain nodes, it can be used to determine which piece of evidence would be most useful 
in resolving any ambiguity that might arise regarding what pathway an organization is 
taking.  Or, it could be used to determine what piece of evidence would be most 
detrimental to an organization’s attempt to acquire nuclear weapons if it were false.  This 
knowledge may be helpful in allocating resources to stop their efforts.  Details 
concerning how this value is calculated can be found in Netica’s documentation. 
 
Network Organization 
The examples used above are organized from the specific to the general.  The 
specific pieces of evidence are parent nodes to the general pathway that they represent.  
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The specific pathways are parent nodes to the general decision.  This may seem like a 
logical manner to organize a network, however it was discovered that this scheme 
presented some disadvantages. 
Many of the problems with organizing the network from the specific to the 
general that manifested themselves were directly or indirectly the result of one 
phenomenon.  By examining Fig. 4 and Fig. 5, the reader may notice that after the 
evidence was added and the probability distribution of Pathway 1 changed, the parent 
node Evidence B, which was not made true, did not change at all.  A parent node may 
influence its child node, but it cannot have any affect on the other parent nodes of that 
child.  This makes sense and is useful for many purposes, but there are a few places in 
this project’s network where this property is undesirable. 
For example, consider the simplified portion of the network given in Fig. 6.  
When reprocessing spent fuel, the spent fuel has to have its cladding removed and then be 
dissolved, which releases radioactive gasses that are indicators of the process.  This is 
modeled from the specific to the general in Fig. 6.  Discovering that an organization has 
acquired spent fuel as well as the ability to remove its cladding can be suggestive that 
they will reprocess fuel.  Also, if a plant is discovered that is emitting signature gasses 
then it can be concluded that the organization is reprocessing fuel. Knowing that the 
organization is reprocessing fuel means that the organization has already acquired spent 
fuel and the ability to remove its cladding.  But because Reprocessing Release Gasses 
and Separate Fuel & Cladding are both parents to the node Dissolved Fuel Elements, the 
evidence of reprocessing given in Fig. 6 does not properly impact the probability of 
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having spent fuel and cladding removal ability.  The new evidence of reprocessing gases 
affects the nodes down the chain as desired; however, up the chain it does not. 
 
Fig. 6. A reprocessing section flowing from specific to general with evidence 
Furthermore, suppose there is evidence that an organization has acquired the 
pieces to an implosion package.  This is suggestive that the organization is pursuing an 
implosion device.  Knowledge that supports an implosion device should also make other 
pathways necessary for that design more likely.  But in a network set up from specific to 
general, different pathways needed for an implosion device would be parents of the node 
for an implosion device, and therefore knowledge of one could not impact the other. 
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Another type of problem that occurs in setting up a network going from specific 
to general is an inconsistency between how the node behaves depending on where 
evidence is added.  Consider Fig. 5 and recall how as each of the evidence associated 
with Pathway 1 is made true, the probability of Pathway 1 being true is increased.  
Compare this to Fig. 7 where it is known that Pathway 1 is the pathway that is being 
taken.  The reader will notice that the likelihood of evidence corresponding to Pathway 1 
did not increase significantly from the value of their priors displayed in Fig. 4.  Since 
each piece of evidence impacts the truth of Pathway 1, when knowledge that Pathway 1 
is true is given, the corresponding change in probability distribution is split between each 
of the contributing parent nodes.  This is also undesirable since knowledge that a 
particular pathway is true should significantly increase the probability that each of its 
prerequisites is true.   
 
Fig. 7. Example network with evidence added that Pathway 1 was chosen 
  
26
It is noted that this inconsistency can be addressed by using a truth table that only 
allows Pathway 1 to be true if all of its associated evidence is true.  However, this is not a 
desirable solution; in this situation Bayes’ Theorem simplifies to: 
( ) ( )
1
N
n
n
P X P p
=
=∏  (3) 
where ( )P X  is the probability that node X is true and ( )nP p  represents the probability 
that parent node n is true.  While this requires that each of the associated evidences be 
true for Pathway 1 to be true, the straight multiplication of their probabilities means that 
Pathway 1 will never be more true than the least true piece of evidence.  As a result, the 
network loses much of its suggestive capability. 
To avoid these pitfalls, the network is organized from the general to the specific 
as seen in Fig. 8.  One distinction to note between this and the previous arrangement is 
that before, all of the evidence nodes along with Pathway 2 and Pathway 3 were without 
parent nodes.  In this setup only the node Likely Pathway has no parent nodes.  This is an 
important difference that is discussed later. 
One obstacle that is encountered when arranging the network in this fashion is 
that the likelihood of the evidence being true is based on the likelihood that its pathway is 
true.  Thus when any piece of evidence is made true it requires that its parent node be 
true, which in turn results in all of the other evidence for that pathway being true as well.  
This problem is shown in Fig. 9 where Evidence C is made true. 
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Fig. 8. Example network going from general to specific 
 
Fig. 9. Example network going from general to specific with evidence added 
This problem is addressed by creating a new node where a pathway forks that has 
each branch as an option along with an option that none are true.  Since each node 
represents an event, the total probability distribution must equal unity.  In the Boolean-
type nodes this is easy to see since if it is not true it must be false, meaning that the 
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probability of true and false always adds to one.  As a result of the total probability 
distribution being unity, the probability for each option can’t be related to the truth of its 
corresponding branch.  Otherwise, if one branch were true, then all other branches would 
be false.  This is acceptable in a node such as Likely Pathway where each option 
represents the likelihood that a particular path is chosen.  In nodes where each branch 
would be a piece of evidence, forcing them to be mutually exclusive would not be 
beneficial.  To avoid this problem, each of the probability distributions for the new node 
are inverted.  Thus a particular branch is true when the probability distribution associated 
with it in the node is zero.  Furthermore, the probability of the option none being true 
actually represents the probability that all of the options are true.   
This new “inverted” node still does not completely address the issue demonstrated 
in Fig. 9. The truth table for each piece of evidence must also be written so that it has a 
small chance of being false even if its corresponding option on the inverted node is true.  
At the same time, it must also have a small chance of being true when the inverted node 
has a corresponding probability that it is false.  The degree of this deviation away from 
being absolutely true and absolutely false, or “softening” in the truth table determines the 
impact that the evidence has on its pathway.  Whether desired or not, this deviation also 
increases the prior of the node being true as well. 
It is noted that the problem demonstrated in Fig. 8 could also be addressed by 
simply “softening” the evidence nodes and skipping the process of adding a new node.  
However, it was found that this produced a small increase in the prior over the increase 
produced from using an inverted node.  While the difference is only a marginal increase, 
a pathway with several branching points results in a significant increase in the priors on 
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the peripheral nodes.  Furthermore, using the inverted nodes resulted in more desirable 
behavior when adding evidence to the actual network. 
Fig. 10 shows the use of an inverted node to address the issue created by going 
from general to specific seen in Fig. 9.  The inverted node displays information that is 
unintuitive and could serve as a distraction to the user.  The repeated use of these nodes 
also creates unnecessary clutter in the network since the information that is useful is 
displayed in the node adjacent to it (Pathway 1 in the example above).  As a result, these 
nodes are displayed as small circles adjacent to the node that they are used for in the 
network, seen in Fig. 11. 
 
Fig. 10. Example network displaying the belief box of an “inverted node” 
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Fig. 11. Example network using an “inverted node”, shown as the small circle node 
adjacent to Pathway 1 
Priors 
Priors in the network are calculated using constant nodes that represent the 
intentions and resources of an organization, both of which will be discussed in Chapter 
III.  Suppose node n is impacted by the intentions and resources of an organization.  Node 
n will have special nodes, or “prior nodes” created that calculate how it is impacted by 
the value of the intentions and resources.  These prior nodes are then used as parent nodes 
to node n to bias its probability distribution.  In the network, they are displayed as small 
circles adjacent to the node they impact like the inverted nodes, except without links 
connecting them to other nodes.  Calculating the values for these prior nodes is discussed 
in Chapter III. 
As discussed above, parent nodes can affect the probability distributions of their 
children but not other parents of their children.  Therefore wherever the prior nodes are 
applied they cannot impact the probability distributions of the preceding nodes along the 
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pathway.  To demonstrate its importance, suppose that a prior node is used that makes the 
probability of having uranium enrichment capabilities less likely.  While this would cause 
all of the components that are necessary to enrich uranium to be less likely because they 
are down the chain in the network, it would have no impact on the node that precedes 
uranium enrichment capability - actually having enriched uranium.  Therefore, the use of 
the prior node used in this example is meaningless.  However, the prior nodes can be used 
to place biases on how the probability distribution is split whenever a pathway forks. 
To fix this problem, all of the necessary information about the priors of a branch 
in the network must be placed at the root node of the branch, with the exception of prior 
nodes that simply bias one option over another.  Thus, care should be taken in how the 
network is arranged and consideration given to this limitation when organizing the flow 
of a network. 
 
Network Construction 
A network was constructed in Netica that models pathways that an organization 
may take to obtain nuclear weapons.  The network includes a section to develop SNM 
indigenously as well as the pathways of purchase and theft.  The network also includes a 
section for weaponization of any SNM obtained and the pathways to purchase or steal an 
assembled nuclear weapon.  The entire network is shown in Fig. 12 through Fig. 24. 
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Fig. 12. The complete network 
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Fig. 13. HEU section of the network 
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Fig. 14. Enrichment capability portion of the HEU section
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Fig. 15. Uranium feed portion of the HEU section
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Fig. 16. Reprocessing section of the network 
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Fig. 17. Reprocessing equipment portion of the reprocessing section 
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Fig. 18. Spent fuel and reprocessed fuel portion of the reprocessing section
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Fig. 19. Special nuclear material section of the network 
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Fig. 20. Weaponization section of the network
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Fig. 21. Weapons package portion of the weaponization section 
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Fig. 22. Pusher, tamper, and reflector portion of the weaponization section 
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Fig. 23. Completed nuclear device section of the network 
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Fig. 24. Intentions and resources input section of the network 
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CHAPTER III 
MOTIVATIONS, INTENTIONS, AND RESOURCES 
Motivations 
An organization’s motivations play a role in their decisions regarding 
proliferation.  One key aspect of this work is to quantitatively analyze the affects that 
varying motivations have on the pathway choices available.  For this methodology, a list 
of motivations was generated that was derived from the literature available on the 
subject.18,19,20,21   
The motivations are divided into two sections: National and Sub-National.  The 
national motivations are given to represent the reasons that a rogue nation or any nation 
of interest might desire nuclear weapons.  The sub-national motivations are given to 
represent the reasons that a terrorist organization might attempt to acquire nuclear 
weapons.  However, considering some rogue nation’s behavior and transnational 
terrorist organizations such as Al’ Qaeda, the line between the two can be blurred.  This 
is not a problem since both national and sub-national motivations are handled the same, 
so mixing from both groups is acceptable.   
The following is the list of all of the motivations used in this work, broken into 
sub-national and national groups: 
 
Sub-National Motivations 
1. Prestige of Possession: Possessing a nuclear weapon helps to demonstrate an 
organization’s viability or legitimacy. 
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2. Prestige of Capabilities (Peaceful): Demonstrating the capability to produce a 
nuclear weapon increases the prestige of an organization.  However, the 
organization also feels that actually using the weapon would undermine their 
objectives. 
 
3. Prestige of Capabilities (Non-Peaceful): This is the same as prestige of 
capabilities (peaceful), except that using nuclear weapons would not necessarily 
undermine their objectives. 
 
4. Manipulate Adversaries: A group pursues nuclear weapons to use as leverage 
against other organizations or even nations. 
 
5. Apocalyptic Beliefs: The organization believes that the end of the world is near 
and is motivated to take an active role in promoting the event.  Nuclear weapons 
make a very attractive tool for this end. 
 
6. Religious Duty: Religious extremists that believe it is their duty to acquire 
nuclear arms for their ideology. 
 
  
47
7. Psychological Warfare (Non-Use): The group’s aims centers on demoralizing 
and terrifying the populous, but they are not driven to use violence to cause mass 
casualties of innocent victims.  
 
8. Psychological Warfare (Intended Use):  The group is motivated to demoralize 
and terrify a populous and believes that this is best achieved by actually using 
nuclear weapons. 
 
9. War on Own Nation (Separatist): Separatist group that wants to use nuclear 
weapons to combat the current regime in a country. 
 
10. War on Another Nation (Extremist): The organization has a deep hatred for a 
particular people or nation and they feel compelled to acquire nuclear weapons to 
combat their adversary. 
 
National Motivations 
11. Deter Attack from Nuclear Adversary: The nation desires to have nuclear 
weapons to deter attack from an adversary armed with nuclear weapons.  
 
12. Seek Military Superiority: The nation wishes to achieve a superior military 
presence than its competitors and feels that this is best done with nuclear 
weapons as opposed to conventional forces. 
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13. Redress Conventional Military Asymmetry: The nation has an overwhelming 
conventional militarily disadvantage against a rival and seeks nuclear weapons to 
counter this disadvantage. 
 
14. Go Nuclear Before Rival: The nation seeks nuclear weapons to ensure that a rival 
won’t acquire them first and therefore be at a disadvantage in the near future. 
 
15. Intimidate Non-Nuclear Rivals: The nation seeks nuclear weapons to use as 
leverage against a non-nuclear armed rival. 
 
16. Acquire Position in International Forums: The nation seeks to acquire a nuclear 
weapons capability because they believe it will raise their position in 
international forums. 
 
17. Rise to Global Power Status: One consistent characteristic about global super 
powers is that they posses nuclear weapons or at least the capability.  Nations 
wishing to become global powers might see nuclear weapons as a prerequisite for 
being a global power. 
 
18. Enhance International Status: The nation believes that acquiring nuclear weapons 
will raise its international status. 
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19. Demonstrate National Viability: The nation believes that a nuclear weapons 
capability will demonstrate their competency. 
 
20. Assert Military or Political Independence: The nation seeks nuclear weapons to 
prevent dominance from another nation. 
 
21. Divert Domestic Attention: The nation believes that a nuclear weapons program 
might help to divert attention away from difficult internal problems.  
 
22. Enhance Bargaining Position Within an Alliance: The nation believes that 
nuclear weapons will place them in an advantaged position in future negotiations 
with allies. 
 
23. Deter Regional Intervention by Superpower: The nation perceives a 
superpower’s involvement in their regional affairs as unwanted and unjustified 
and believes that possessing nuclear weapons would deter involvement by that 
superpower. 
 
24. Increase Military or Scientific Morale:  The nation believes that acquiring 
nuclear weapons will be a source of pride for their military and scientific 
community. 
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25. Increase Domestic Morale: The nation believes that a nuclear weapons program 
will be a source of national pride for the populous. 
 
26. Reduce Economic Defense Burden: The nation believes that producing nuclear 
weapons is an economical alternative to conventional forces. 
 
Intentions 
The motivations behind an organization’s choice for nuclear weapons influences 
the pathways they take to acquiring them.  However, it is difficult to qualify, and more 
so to quantify, how each of these motivations affect the pathways chosen.  For example, 
it is difficult to determine what pathways are more likely by simply knowing that an 
organization wishes to deter an attack from a nuclear adversary or that they wish to 
intimidate a non-nuclear rival.  However, a nation wishing to deter attack from a nuclear 
adversary will most likely believe that one or two devices will not be a practical 
deterrent to a nation who has several at their disposal. The threatened nation’s nuclear 
objectives will most likely require several weapons and a latent capability to produce 
more so that their adversary knows they can replenish their supply.  From this, it can be 
concluded that it is very unlikely that purchasing or stealing nuclear weapons or SNM 
will be acceptable pathways.  The nation will need the infrastructure to produce SNM 
indigenously so that they can make multiple devices and maintain the ability to produce 
more as needed. 
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Thus, it can be seen that the motivations of an organization directly influences 
the general properties of a weapon or a weapons program. These general properties lead 
to decisions on the most likely pathways that will lead to those properties. We call these 
general properties intentions.  
Thus, motivations determine intentions and intentions influence pathway 
decisions (Fig. 25).  Intentions are divided into four categories as follows: 
 
1. Deliverability:  How deliverable must a nuclear device be to meet an 
organization’s likely goals inferred from their motivations? 
 
2. Yield:  Based on an organization’s motivations, what yield would likely be 
required by their nuclear ambitions? 
 
3. Number of Intended Devices: What is the likely number of devices that an 
organization will attempt to acquire based on their motivations? 
 
4. Sustainability: Considering their motivations, what is the likelihood that an 
organization will desire the latent capability to produce more nuclear weapons in 
the future? 
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Fig. 25. Depiction of how to incorporate motivations into pathway decisions 
Each of the intention categories is broken into ranges to represent each of the 
possible intentions.  Breaking the intentions up into different ranges helps to handle the 
uncertainty when applying a specific value for a category.  The intentions that are used 
are divided the following categories: 
 
Deliverability: The level of deliverability intended for the nuclear device. 
• Non-Deliverable: The device is unable to be delivered to a target, or even 
moved, at least not by any inconspicuous means. 
• Truck: The device can be moved around by a tractor-trailer or other large 
vehicle. 
• Air Drop: The device can be loaded into a large plane and dropped on a 
target. 
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• MIRV-Size Warhead: The device can be attached to larger ballistic 
missiles, comparable in size to the Multiple Independently Targetable 
Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) missiles. 
• Artillery Shell: The device is small enough that it can be projected out of 
larger artillery or attached to smaller missiles. 
• Suitcase: A device that is small enough to fit inside a suitcase. 
 
Yield: The designed explosive power of the nuclear device expressed in 
equivalent tons of TNT. 
• 0.1kT - 1kT∗ 
• 1kT - 10kT  
• 10kT - 20kT 
• 20kT - 150kT 
• 150kT - 1MT 
• 1MT - 10 MT 
 
Number of Intended Devices: The number of devices that an organization 
desires. 
• 1 
• 2 – 4 
                                                 
∗ This is interpreted as an intention to create a 0.1kT – 1kT device, not a fizzile. Generally, for nuclear 
explosions it is more difficult to intentionally create a device with a small yield than one with a larger 
yield. 
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• 5 – 10 
• 10 – 100 
• 100 + 
Sustainability: The probability of maintaining latent nuclear capabilities. 
• yes 
• no 
 
Calculating Intentions 
Once selected, the motivations are combined so that they impact the intentions in 
the desired manner.  Each intention i, is assigned a probability that it is true for a given 
motivation, m.  This probability is represented by miν .  Values for miν are assigned by 
asking the question: “based on motivation m, how probable is it that an organization 
would consider the intention i, the required minimum for success in its intention 
category?”  Each motivation m is assigned a weight, mw .  This weight represents the 
importance of this motivation relative to the other motivations for an organization. These 
weights are assigned such that: 
( )0,mw ∈ ∞  (4) 
and are normalized as follows: 
m
m M
m
m
wk
w
=
∑
 (5) 
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The normalized weights for an organization of interest’s motivations are 
combined with the probability assigned to each intention for a given motivation as 
follows: 
( )
1
m
M
m
i i
m
k
u ν
=
=∏  (6) 
where ui represents the probability that i is the intention of the organization.  
This method of attribute aggregation was chosen because (1) unlike a simple 
weighted average formula, it possesses the ability to be zero if any one of its inputs is 
zero, and (2) it was not quite as harsh as straight multiplication.  
In Fig. 26 the term ( ) mmi kν  in Eq. (6) is plotted for various values of .mk   The 
plot shows that if the value of miν  is zero then the function is zero for all mk .  Thus, the 
probability calculated for iu  is zero.  Since the weighting values of the motivations are 
normalized, as more motivations are considered, the average value of mk  must decrease.  
The plot shows that as mk  decreases, the function approaches unity faster.  Therefore, 
the calculated probability iu  does not naturally converge to zero as the number of 
motivations considered increases like straight multiplication would. 
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Fig. 26. Behavior of utility function for calculating iu  
The values of miν generated for this project are given in the appendixes. 
 
Resources 
Constant nodes are also included in the network to represent resources. The three 
constant nodes for resources used in this model are: 
 
1. International Networking: This resource represents the connections that an 
organization might have to other assets globally.  This parameter is an indicator 
of such things as alliances to other organizations, access to the Black Market, 
assets working abroad, etc.   
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2. Technical Capabilities: This resource is designed to give some quantification to 
an organization’s perceived technical abilities.  It represents a measure of how 
educated, skilled and capable the organization’s scientists are.   
 
3. Available Infrastructure: This resource represents the local infrastructure 
available and how much it may contribute to necessary components in a weapons 
program.   
 
Each of the resource nodes is assigned one of the following values:  
 
• Excellent 
• Great 
• Good 
• Fair 
• Poor 
• Abysmal 
Each selection has a numerical value between zero and one associated with it that 
is used in the calculation of the prior nodes that are dependent on the resource.   
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Calculating the Priors 
The intentions for a particular category are combined to calculate a value for the 
prior nodes discussed in Chapter II.  The value of the corresponding prior node is 
calculated using: 
( ) 1
1
P
I
n
i i
n i
i I
i
i
u
u
u
β
=
=
=
∑
∑
 (7) 
where ( )Pn iu  represents the probability that node n is true given iu , but no evidence. 
And niβ  represents the importance of node n to intention i.   
Calculating the priors using resources is done in a slightly different manner than 
the intentions.  Since there are not categories of intentions that need to be combined, a 
prior node, n, that just accounts for the effect of a resource, r, is calculated by: 
( ) 0 1Pn n nr rβ β= +  (8) 
where n0β  is the likelihood without a resource, r, and n1β  is the contribution that resource 
r makes.  Since the input from the constant node r is a value between zero and one, and 
the value of ( )rnΡ  must be between zero and one, the constraint in Eq. (9) must be 
observed when deciding the values of n0β  and n1β : 
[ ]1,010 ∈+ nn ββ  (9) 
Usually, however, the affect that a resource has is also a function of a particular intention 
category.   
Therefore, the equation used to calculate a prior node for resources that are a 
function of an intention category is: 
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It is important to note that a resource may make a pathway less likely, thus ni,1β  can also 
be negative so long as the end result still falls between zero and one.  Since r is a number 
between zero and one, this condition can be met by the constraint 
[ ]1,0,1,0 ∈+ nini ββ  (11) 
The prior nodes are used as parents to the nodes that they impact.  The truth table 
for a node with a prior node as a parent is written so that the pathway that the prior node 
impacts can only be true when the prior node is true.  In that way, the probability 
distribution of the pathway is governed by the value that is calculated by the prior node.  
Thus the probability distribution is governed by the motivations and resources of an 
organization of interest. 
 
Implementation 
When running a case in the network the first thing that is done is to consider the 
motivations of the organization the user wishes to model.  Assigning values to the 
motivations in the Excel spreadsheet gives the user the calculated values of the 
intentions.  These intentions must be typed into their corresponding constant nodes in the 
network.  The next step is for the user to select values for the resource nodes.  Once this 
is done, the network is compiled in Netica and the organization of interest is ready to be 
examined. 
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It is necessary at this point to discuss the meaning of the probabilities presented 
by the nodes in this network.  As with any decision analysis model, the accuracy of the 
output is only as good as the accuracy of the input given.  The calculated value for 
success given is dependent on a very large number of user generated values.  With that 
in mind, this methodology shouldn’t be seen as a way of accusing organization Y of 
having an X percent chance of acquiring nuclear weapons.  Rather, the methodology 
should be seen as one tool among many that predicts the relative threat that an 
organization poses to nuclear proliferation.  Furthermore, the methodology is intended to 
provide a means for an analyst to examine how varying parameters and evidence impacts 
these probabilities, and expose places along a pathway that can be used to prevent an 
organization from proliferating. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CODE VERIFICATION 
A number of example scenarios were executed to verify that the code system 
performed as expected.  These scenarios were also used to test the strengths and 
weaknesses of the system developed.  These scenarios are not intended to model any 
particular organization but to consider a few general cases, for both state and sub-state 
actors.  It should be noted that the arrangement of the figures depicting nodes from the 
network in this chapter won’t always match the arrangement shown in Chapter II.  
Nodes are often moved closer together and some nodes and links are removed from the 
Fig. altogether to limit the amount of information presented. 
 
Case 1: Small Fanatical Religious Group 
The first case examined is a regional terrorist organization comprised of religious 
fanatics.  The organization is motivated primarily by an apocalyptic belief.  As a 
regional sub national group, they have poor connections and no technical skills or 
helpful infrastructure at their disposal.  Furthermore, this organization has no access to 
uranium mines or a nuclear reactor.  The input for this organization is given in Fig. 27 
and the motivation and resource values used are seen in TABLE I. 
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TABLE I 
Motivations and resources used in Case 1 
Prestige of Possession 1 International Networking Poor
Apocalyptic Beliefs 1 Technical Capability Abysmal
Religious Duty 2 Available Infrastructure Abysmal
Case 1
Motivations Resources
 
 
Fig. 27. Input display for Case 1 
The intentions of this organization show that they have very minimal 
requirements for a nuclear weapon.  However, even with low requirements, an 
organization with no means to develop a weapon or any outside connections to otherwise 
procure one is still expected to fail.  Many regional terrorist groups have attempted to 
acquire nuclear weapons but none to date have been known to succeed.   
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In Fig. 28, the key nodes pertaining to the probability distributions for the 
organization obtaining a nuclear weapon are given.  In the node labeled Fabricate 
Device are the probability distributions for an organization to assemble the necessary 
SNM pit and weaponization components themselves.  The nodes labeled for each 
weapon type show the probability distribution of making, purchasing, and stealing the 
respective design.  The node Acquire Weapon gives the probability that the organization 
will acquire one of the three designs considered, independent of the means used to 
acquire it.  Finally, the probability of acquiring any of the nuclear weapon types is given 
in the node labeled Nuclear Device.  
 
Fig. 28. Weapon development probabilities for Case 1 
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As expected, the organization has a very low chance of success, just 0.62%, 
according to the model.  Their most likely path is to purchase and assembled device.  If 
the organization is to assemble the weapon themselves, the most likely choice is an HEU 
gun type.  These results agree with our intuition of the decision the organization would 
make given their resources and intentions.  Fig. 29 shows a selected portion of the 
network that displays the probabilities associated with acquiring SNM for this scenario.  
The purchase or theft of SNM is more likely than producing it indigenously.  For the 
case of plutonium, the chance of producing it themselves is almost zero.  The 
organization was given the worst possible rating for available infrastructure, and 
evidence is already added that they do not have access to a reactor from which they can 
divert fuel.  Also, because of the organization’s low technical capabilities and their lack 
of desire for a higher-yield, more deliverable weapon, the easiest path is to make a gun 
type device, which results in reducing the attractiveness of trying to acquire plutonium.  
So efforts made in producing SNM are biased toward HEU. 
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Fig. 29. Selected nodes displaying SNM probabilities in Case 1 
A further hindrance to success for the organization is their low likelihood of 
being able to machine SNM.  Thus, the organization has a higher chance of purchasing 
or stealing a prefabricated pit than manufacturing their own.   
 
Effect of Evidence Against Machining Capability 
To further examine the organization, suppose that it is known with confidence 
that high precision machining, is beyond their capabilities.  By making the nodes for 
high precision machining and SNM machining false, the probability that the 
organization will successfully obtain nuclear weapons decreases.  The new probability 
distributions are given in Fig. 30.  The probability distributions for fabricating the device 
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dropped almost to zero.  Without the ability to properly machine a tamper, reflector, or a 
pusher, there is almost no chance to weaponize an SNM pit.  Therefore, the vast majority 
of the probability of success remaining rests in purchasing or stealing assembled 
weapons.  
 
Fig. 30. Results for Case 1 after evidence is added that the organization does not possess 
any precision machining capabilities 
Effect of Changes to Organization Resources 
The effect of changes of an organization’s resources was examined.  The 
organization’s international networking was changed to “great”, the results are shown in 
Fig. 31.  As the international networking resource is increased the probability of theft 
and purchase also increase, and therefore increase the overall chance of success. 
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Fig. 31. Results for Case 1 when international networking is changed to “great” 
Case 2: Semi-Developed Rogue Nation 
This case examines a rogue nation that wants to acquire nuclear weapons.  The 
nation is not particularly developed; however, it has been using a hedging strategy to put 
infrastructure in place.  The nation in this case has acquired a nuclear reactor and has 
sent many citizens abroad for study and training in the nuclear field.  Furthermore, the 
leaders of the rouge nation are believed to be cooperative with known terrorist 
organizations.  Continued defiance of international norms has put the nation at odds with 
the world’s superpowers.  The nation fears an invasion may be used as a means to 
replace the regime.  The input for this organization is given in Fig. 32 and the motivation 
and resource values used are seen in TABLE II. 
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TABLE II 
Motivations and resources used in Case 2 
Deter Attack from Nuclear 
Adversary 1 International Networking Great
Acquire Position in 
International Forums 1 Technical Capability Good
Enhance International Status 2 Available Infrastructure Fair
Motivations Resources
Case 2
 
 
Fig. 32. Inputs for Case 2 
The organization is likely to seek weapons with a higher yield and deliverability 
than the previous case.  Furthermore, this time the organization desires many more 
devices and will most likely require a sustainable program.  The results for this case are 
given in Fig. 33.  Despite the increased difficulty in the likely weapon program, the 
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increased resources and the advantage of having a reactor make this organization about 
four times more likely to succeed then the organization in Case 1. 
 
Fig. 33. Initial results for Case 2 
There is almost no chance of stealing or purchasing a nuclear weapon for this 
case.  This is not a result of a low international networking resource, but is due to the 
intention of developing a larger number of devices as well as a sustainable program.  
The most likely design type in this scenario is the plutonium implosion design.  Using 
plutonium has the greatest chance of success since evidence is added that the rogue 
nation possess a nuclear reactor.  Also, the HEU implosion design is more likely than the 
HEU gun type.  This is a result of the need for higher yields and deliverability. 
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Fig. 34 presents the enrichment results for this scenario.  The resources of this 
organization result in a 24.2% chance of being able to enrich uranium prior to any 
evidence being given.  Gaseous centrifuge is the most likely method.  The next two 
candidates are aerodynamic separation and gaseous diffusion.  EMIS and laser isotope 
separation are the least likely.  These results agree with intuition as well as historical 
evidence from recent proliferation cases. 
 
Fig. 34. Enrichment capability nodes for Case 2 
Effect of Evidence Against Uranium Mining and Enrichment 
Suppose that the nation does not have any significant uranium deposits to mine, 
and furthermore, many key components of the various enrichment methods are 
unavailable as well.  Fig. 35 shows the probabilities for acquiring SNM and for 
obtaining a weapon pit after this evidence was added.  The organization has a reasonable 
chance of obtaining plutonium (44.3%), almost all of which comes from the probability 
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of producing the plutonium themselves.  However, for HEU the chances are much less 
(0.36%), almost none of which comes from the ability to produce it themselves. 
Even though the organization has a good chance of acquiring plutonium, their 
chances of acquiring a usable pit from this material are much less at 16.1%.  The 
organization’s inability to machine SNM is a formidable hindrance to producing nuclear 
weapons decreasing their chances of acquiring a useable pit to 16.1%.  
 
Fig. 35. Selected nodes displaying SNM probability distributions for Case 2 after 
evidence is added against uranium enrichment and mining 
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Fig. 36 shows the change in the results after considering the new evidence.  The 
chances of fabricating an HEU implosion or HEU gun type device are negligible.   The 
overall probability of success decreased from 2.30% to 1.84%.  The probability that a 
plutonium implosion device will be constructed increased, since it is the only viable 
option left.  The difficulty of weaponization of plutonium pits results in the decrease 
from 16.1% chance of acquiring a Pu pit to 1.76% chance of fabricating a plutonium 
implosion weapon.  Implosion devices are significantly more challenging to produce 
than gun type designs, and plutonium is a more challenging material to work with than 
HEU. 
 
Fig. 36. Results for Case 2 with enrichment capability and uranium mine are false 
Effect of Evidence Against Spent Fuel Diversion 
Next, assume that the IAEA inspected the organization’s reactor and determined 
that all of the spent fuel was accounted for and therefore, even though they have a 
reactor, it is not being used as a source for spent fuel to reprocess.  Fig. 37 shows the 
spent fuel section of the network with the evidence added that spent fuel is not being 
acquired from a domestic reactor.  This new evidence results in the total probability that 
the organization has spent fuel to reprocess being less than 1%.   
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Fig. 37. Spent fuel section of the network for Case 2 with evidence that spent fuel has 
not been removed from the organizations reactor 
The probability of the organization acquiring a nuclear weapon after this 
evidence is added is given in Fig. 38.  As expected, with no options available produce 
SNM, the probability of fabricating a weapon decreases significantly.  The probability 
that does remain is the small contributions from the theft and purchase of an SNM pit, 
which are still hindered by the intention of a large sustainable program.  The rogue 
nation now only has a 0.12% chance of success. 
 
Fig. 38. Results for Case 2 with evidence that spent fuel has not been removed from the 
organizations reactor added 
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Effect of Evidence for Radioactive Reprocessing Gasses 
The next evidence that will be examined in this scenario is what happens to the 
network when radioactive gases released in reprocessing operations are discovered at a 
plant in that country.  Fig. 39 displays the network with the evidence added for these 
release gases. 
 
Fig. 39. Evidence added of reprocessing gases found  
The spent fuel section of the network with the results from the new evidence is 
given in Fig. 40.  The evidence added is a strong indicator that the organization is 
currently reprocessing spent fuel. The probability that the organization has spent fuel 
increased dramatically up to 83.3% from 0.72, seen in Fig. 37.  But where did this fuel 
come from since evidence is already given that all of the fuel in the organization’s 
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reactor is accounted for?  Since the large sustainable program that is likely desired 
makes theft and purchase unlikely candidates, the network predicts that the most likely 
source of the spent fuel is diversion from an unknown reactor, at 83.1%. As discussed in 
Chapter II, this diversion doesn’t necessarily mean the fuel was taken from another 
nation’s nuclear reactor, but could be an unknown reactor that the organization 
possesses.   
 
Fig. 40. Spent fuel section after evidence is added for reprocessing gases 
The conclusion may be that the rogue nation has covertly developed a plutonium 
production reactor, one that is not under the inspection of the IAEA, to acquire SNM.  
There are historical cases where nations go to great lengths to covertly attempt to 
produce SNM.  For instance, during the first gulf war with Iraq, the nonproliferation 
community was shocked when the scope of the Iraqi uranium enrichment program 
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buried in the dessert was discovered.  Since all remaining states without nuclear 
weapons are non-NWS of the NPT, any attempts at producing SNM without 
international backlash would need to be covert. 
The impact that this new evidence has on the organization’s success is given in 
Fig. 41.  The probability is now 7.62%, which is more than when the only evidence was 
that the organization had a domestic reactor, seen in Fig. 33.  Despite adding evidence 
that the HEU pathway was negligible and that the organization was not diverting from 
their known reactor, their probability of completing their nuclear weapon goals increased 
because the evidence of the release gases is a strong indicator that the organization had 
actually taken the step to reprocess the spent fuel.  While it was known in the beginning 
that the organization had a domestic reactor, there was no evidence that they had actually 
made strides towards actually separating the plutonium out of the fuel.   
 
Fig. 41. Results for Case 2 with reprocessing gases added 
Sensitivity Analysis 
The final thing that will be demonstrated in this case is a sensitivity analysis.  As 
mentioned in Chapter II, Netica allows the user to select a node in the network and 
calculate what node has the largest impact on its value.  This calculation includes the 
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evidence that is already added to the network.  In order to do a sensitivity analysis, the 
user needs to highlight which node to analyze and then highlight the nodes that the user 
wishes to test by holding the control key down and clicking on different nodes.  Next the 
user selects “Sensitivity to Findings” in the “Network” tab at the top of the program.   
If the user only highlights the node that the sensitivity analysis is desired on and 
then runs the analysis, Netica will calculate the sensitivity for every node in the network.  
This is not overly useful since the network contains many nodes, such as prior nodes and 
inverted nodes, that serve a specific function.  There are also several regular nodes, such 
as steal or purchase a completed device, that are not helpful to analyze either.  Since 
stealing or purchasing a completed device automatically makes the weapons program 
successful, making any one of these nodes true will always have the biggest impact. 
Thus it is beneficial for the user to select the nodes that should be analyzed to avoid 
generating a list that is cumbersome to weed through to get the information that is 
desired.   
Another type of node that may or may not be important to consider is the nodes 
where pathways fork.  A node that represents the culmination of its constituent pathway 
will always be more important than any of its single components.  For example, the node 
for a machined pusher is always going to be more important to the final result than 
pusher materials or precision machining capabilities.  This is because for a machined 
pusher to be true, both machining capabilities and pusher materials had to be true.  Thus 
a comparison of the three is unfair.  A fair comparison would be only between the pusher 
material and the machining capability; it would also be fair to compare the machined 
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pusher against the machined reflector or machined tamper.  Depending on the detail that 
the user wishes to analyze, it may be preferable to only consider the nodes at the end of 
various branches, or only nodes that are one step in from the end of the branch, and so 
on.  Either way, when looking at the calculated sensitivity values it is important to 
consider whether apples are being compared to apples.   
When a sensitivity analysis is performed, Netica creates a report that displays 
how much the probability distribution of the node analyzed is influenced by making 
other nodes true.  Netica creates a report that first lists each node and how much several 
different sensitivity measures impact the node in question.  The second part of the report 
displays a summary table that compares the findings for each node with two columns of 
numbers.  Netica recommends that the first column, which compares the amount of 
mutual information the two nodes share in the network, should be looked at if the user 
wants a single value that best describes the degree of sensitivity.  The list generated in 
the report is arranged from the node that has the greatest impact to the node that has the 
least impact according to the number in the first column.  This is the number that is used 
for sensitivity analysis purposes in this work.  For complete details about the functions 
used in the sensitivity analysis, the user can contact Norsys, the creator of Netica.  Fig. 
42 gives the results of the summary section of the sensitivity analysis performed on Case 
2.  
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Fig. 42. Sensitivity analysis run on Case 2 to compare select nodes in the weaponization 
section and the ability to machine SNM 
Fig. 42 shows that the ability to machine SNM will give the organization the 
biggest gain toward their nuclear weapon program.  This is not surprising considering 
that the organization already has a very high chance of obtaining SNM.  Removing the 
obstacle of manufacturing a usable pit leaves only the weaponization to prevent the 
organization from producing nuclear weapons.  
 
Case 3: International Extremist Group with National Sponsorship 
This case examines an international extremist group that has many sympathizers 
positioned throughout the populace and in the government of a rogue nation, which has a 
covert weapons program.  The advantage the terrorist group gains from having help from 
the rogue nation is treated as if the terrorist organization is given the resources of the 
state.  While complete access to a nation’s resources is not a conceivable situation and 
offers an unfair advantage, this scenario is invented to show the use of the methodology, 
not to model a specific organization. The input for this organization is given in Fig. 43 
and the motivation and resource values used are seen in Table III. 
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Table III 
Motivations and resources used in Case 3 
Prestige of Capabilities (Non-
Peaceful) 1 International Networking Great 
Manipulate Adversaries 2 Technical Capability Good
Psychological Warfare 
(Intended Use) 1 Available Infrastructure Good
War on Another Nation 
(Extremist) 3
Case 3
Motivations Resources
 
 
Fig. 43. Input display for Case 3 
To examine the likelihood of different pathways that this organization will take, a 
different approach will be used than in the previous cases.  In this scenario, evidence is 
given that the organization has successfully developed a nuclear weapon.  The 
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probability distributions that are created in this scenario are not the probabilities that the 
organization has a particular component or will successfully complete a particular step.  
Instead, since success is a given, the probability distributions for each node represent the 
likelihood that the organization will require a particular component or will attempt to 
take a particular step.   
This is helpful because it is important for the user to question how much faith can 
be placed in the accuracy of the final value given.  Very few nations have successfully 
developed nuclear weapons and to date, no terrorist group has either.  Thus, there is not 
an abundance of data to draw statistical conclusions about the probabilities of success.  
Examining a case by making success a given eliminates that aspect and allows the user 
to compare the likelihood of various pathways. 
The probability distributions for completed nuclear weapons are given in Fig. 44.  
On the left side the node labeled Fabricated Device shows that there is a 77.8% percent 
chance that the organization would attempt to weaponize machined SNM.  On the 
Fabricated Device node the two HEU weapon types are the most likely to be produced.  
This is a result of which SNM they are likely to pursue, seen in Fig. 45.  
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Fig. 44. Output of Case 3 showing evidence that the organization has acquired a nuclear 
weapon 
 
Fig. 45. SNM section of the network for Case 3 
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The SNM section of the network reveals that the organization has almost a 70% 
chance of attempting to produce an HEU pit and only about a 13% chance of using Pu.  
There is almost a 10% chance that the organization would attempt to steal the HEU pit 
and avoid machining it themselves.  For obtaining HEU there is almost a 20% chance 
that the organization would attempt to purchase or steal it, and a little over 40% chance 
that they will attempt to produce it on their own.   
Making HEU requires the organization to obtain some source of uranium feed 
along with the ability to enrich it.  Since the organization has no mining source of 
uranium, they would be required to procure uranium through theft or purchase of natural, 
depleted, or low enriched uranium.  With the intended number of devices so low for this 
organization, acquiring uranium feed material becomes feasible, if only slightly.  The 
important nodes for uranium enrichment are given in Fig. 46.  Gaseous centrifuge is the 
most likely enrichment method used, followed by EMIS and aerodynamic separation.   
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Fig. 46. Uranium enrichment nodes from the network for Case 3 
Effect of Evidence Against Weapons Package 
Evidence is added to the network in the same manner as the other scenarios.  For 
instance, making the weapons package pathway false forces the implosion pathway to 
become essentially zero. Fig. 47 shows the updated probabilities when this evidence is 
added.  As expected, without a weapons package the only feasible pathway for 
indigenously fabricating a weapon is the gun type design.  The probability of theft or 
purchase of a weapon increased, from a total of 22.2% to 34.6%, since the pathway to 
producing an implosion device was essentially removed. 
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Fig. 47. Results for Case 3 after the weapons package node is made false 
Case 4: Developed Nation 
In the final scenario, a first world nation that has a fully developed civilian 
nuclear program is examined.  The nation for this scenario enriches its own fuel for its 
fleet of domestic reactors with a large gaseous centrifuge plant.  Furthermore, the nation 
is on a closed fuel cycle and reprocesses its spent fuel.  The large industrial base of the 
nation already has high precision machining capabilities, as well as the ability to 
machine SNM.  No perceived military scenario requires nuclear weapons; however, 
popular opinion is evolving to believe that indigenous nuclear weapons are necessary as 
a matter of pride.  The input for this organization is given in Fig. 48 and the motivation 
and resource values used are seen in Table IV. 
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Table IV 
Motivations and resources used in Case 4 
Increase Domestic Morale 1 International Networking Poor
Technical Capability Excellent
Available Infrastructure Excellent
Case 4
Motivations Resources
 
 
Fig. 48. Input for Case 4 
Evidence is given in the network that the nation possesses precision machining as 
well as SNM machining capabilities.  Evidence is also given for compressors, uranium 
hexafluoride, high strength rotors, and the other components of a gaseous centrifuge 
plant.  Evidence is also added regarding their reprocessing plant.  The nation’s research 
institutions have deuterium-tritium (D-T) generators and possess the skills to produce 
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any of the components in a nuclear weapons package.  Finally, their industrial base is 
capable of providing any materials desired to use in the weapons construction, 
particularly materials for a tamper, reflector, and pusher.  After entering all of the 
evidence above, the results produced are given in Fig. 49. 
 
Fig. 49. Results for Case 4 
The chance for success in this scenario is 99.9% and all of it is contributed to 
indigenously fabricating the nuclear weapons.  The extremely high probability for 
success should be no surprise since evidence was given that each obstacle faced in 
producing a nuclear weapon covered in this network would be overcome.   
The motivations given in this case produce intentions that don’t demand an 
implosion device.  Therefore, the user might expect to again see the gun type device as 
the most likely.  However, the gun type design is drastically less likely than an implosion 
design.  This is because (1) all of the pieces were given for the weapons package of an 
implosion device, (2) the evidence for precision machining along with having various 
materials that may be used for a pusher result in a high likelihood of a machined pusher, 
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and (3) the high technical capability resource imparts a slight bias toward implosion over 
gun type.   
The second reason exposes a shortcoming of the network.  The network infers 
that if an organization is capable of doing something, they will.  Thus, with evidence 
added that the nation possesses machining capabilities and pusher materials, the nation 
has a machined pusher.  Therefore, the network is unable to account for acts of 
deception.  
 
Importance of Evidence Compared to Resources and Intentions 
Suppose the nation’s motivations change to motivations that require a more 
robust weapon program. The resource and evidence is all the same, but the motivations 
change to the following list and the new input into the network is given in Fig. 50. 
 
Motivations used for second part of Case 4: 
• Deter Attack from Nuclear Adversary: 1 
• Seek Military Superiority: 2 
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Fig. 50. New inputs used for Case 4 
The devices desired now need greater deliverability and higher yields.  
Furthermore, the number of devices desired increased dramatically and a sustainable 
program is needed.  The probability of success remains extremely high at 99.7% as seen 
in Fig. 51. 
 
Fig. 51. Results for Case 4 using new motivations 
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Next, leaving everything else the same, the resources are changed.  The nation 
was given high values for resources, suppose this advantage is removed.  All three 
resources are set to “Abysmal” and the results are given in Fig. 52. 
 
Fig. 52. Results for Case 4 with all resources set to “Abysmal” 
As one might expect, the chance of success did decrease as all of the 
organization’s resources were removed.  However, the chance of success (96%) did not 
decrease by any appreciable amount and reveals an underlying aspect of Bayesian 
statistics.  Considering the three results given in this case, it would seem that intentions 
and resources have no significant impact on the results.  This is in fact true, but only in a 
case such as this one where much of the evidence is known.   
The reason that the intentions and resources fail to hinder the chance of success 
is that the evidence given is enough to define the majority of the system.  The resources 
and intentions are used to calculate the subjectively defined priors of the network, which 
state the belief that an event is true without knowledge that any other events have 
occurred.  These priors represent the uncertainty in the system.  But as evidence is 
added, this uncertainty in the system is removed.  Therefore, when all of the evidence is 
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known, there is no uncertainty left and the priors play no role in defining the probability 
distributions of the system.  The actual truth of each event is known, and there is no 
longer a need for a belief that it is true. 
 
Scenario Conclusions 
The scenarios in this chapter demonstrate the network’s ability to make 
inferences that agree with intuition and highlight the strengths and limitations of the 
model.  The first case shows that an organization with limited resources has a minimal 
chance of success.  The most likely pathway predicted in that scenario was theft or 
purchase of an assembled device.  The second scenario demonstrated how increasing 
resources increased the probability of success.  Furthermore, the second case showed 
that an organization desiring a large number of devices and a sustainable program will 
be unlikely to purchase or steal SNM or an assembled device.  Also, these two cases 
highlight how an organization whose intentions need higher yields and deliverability are 
more likely to pursue implosion devices over gun type devices. Case 3 demonstrated a 
scenario where evidence was given that an organization already had a nuclear weapon, 
which showed how the Bayesian network can work backwards to predict the most likely 
path the organization would have taken to obtain that weapon. Finally, in Case 4 it was 
seen that an organization that can obtain SNM, machine it into a usable pit, and 
weaponize the pit has a very high chance of success, which is expected. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of the work presented in this paper was to create a methodology to 
analyze pathways of nuclear weapons development, incorporating an organization’s 
motivations and any pertinent evidence.  The methodology makes predictions about the 
most likely path that an organization will take.  Furthermore, the tool could be used to 
evaluate how applicable evidence impacts the likelihood of these pathways and as a 
means to assess the relative threat that different organizations pose to nuclear 
proliferation. 
This methodology was implemented in a Bayesian Network developed using the 
Netica software package.  The motivations and critical resources were incorporated 
through the use of the priors.  The difficulty of determining how a particular motivation 
affects the network pathways was addressed by the use of intentions as an intermediary.  
Several cases were examined to show how evidence impacts the pathways and 
demonstrate the methodology’s capabilities.  These cases were also used to validate the 
model’s capability to produce decision results that agree with intuition. 
For example, an organization that is not particular regarding the yield and 
deliverability of their nuclear weapon is predicted to choose a gun type design over an 
implosion design.  Motivations that desired a larger number of devices or a sustainable 
program were unlikely to steal or purchase nuclear weapons.  Furthermore, the cases 
demonstrated that organizations with greater resources were more likely to succeed, and 
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that sub national organizations, such as terrorist groups, had almost no chance of 
success.  Finally, it was demonstrated that evidence supporting (or rejecting) a pathway 
increases (or decreases) the probabilities along the pathway.  It was seen that the 
motivations biased the various pathways more than resources, however, resources had a 
greater impact on an organization’s overall chance of success. 
The scenarios discussed in Chapter IV highlight a few limitations of the 
methodology.  First, the model assumes that if an organization is capable of doing 
something, they will.  Thus, any acts of deception can not be accounted for in the model.  
Next, many nodes in the model contain an underlying assumption that only one choice 
out of many will be made.  Therefore, weapon programs where many pathways are taken 
in parallel are not properly modeled.  Finally, as with any decision analysis tool, the 
accuracy of the output can only be as good as the input. 
Several endeavors can be pursued to improve upon the methodology created 
here.   
 
1. Expert elicitation could be used to obtain more correct input values and even 
their corresponding statistical uncertainty.   
2. A more accurate and complete model can be produced if both the number of 
pathways and the level of their detail are increased. 
3. The deliverability aspect could be improved by having a branch for missile 
technologies and capabilities 
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4. Demotivating factors for nuclear proliferation should also be considered, 
allowing motivations a similar ability to impact the overall success as resources 
do. 
5. Additional organization resource development used in the priors should be 
considered. 
Including resources was not part of the initial scope of this project.  The three 
used were deemed necessary to allow the network to differentiate between certain 
scenarios that logically had very different outcomes, which could not be accomplished 
by the motivations alone.  The resources of an organization can be systematically broken 
down into their base components, similar to how the motivations and intentions were 
dissected, and a system developed to implement them into the network.  Pertinent 
resources that also might be considered for integration in to the model could include 
time, money, available work force, land availability, and special forces availability. 
This work developed first, published, quantitative methodology for predicting 
nuclear proliferation with consideration for how an organization’s motivations impact 
their pathway probabilities.  The methodology produced and presented in this paper has 
limitations, but it will serve as a valuable tool and will aid in the fight to combat nuclear 
proliferation. 
 
  
95
REFERENCES  
1. B. Hoffman, “Terrorism and WMD: Some Preliminary Hypotheses,” The 
Nonproliferation Review, 4, (43), 45-53 (1997). 
2. C. D. Ferguson and W.C. Potter, “Improvised Nuclear Devices and Nuclear 
Terrorism,” The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, (viewed March 
2008); available on the Internet at (http://www.wmdcommission.org/ 
files/No2.pdf). 
3. M. Hynes and J. Peters, “Denying Armageddon: Preventing Terrorist Use of 
Nuclear Weapons,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, 607, 150-161 (2006). 
4. R. Gallucci, “Averting Nuclear Catastrophe: Contemplating Extreme Responses 
to U.S. Vulnerability,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, 607, 51-58 (2006). 
5. Nuclear Regulatory Legislation, 107th Congress; 1st Session. Vol. 1, No. 6, 
(2002); available on the Internet at (http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-
collections/nuregs/staff/sr0980/ml022200075-
vol1.pdf#pagemode=bookmarks&page=213).  
6. R. G. Cochran and N. Tsoulfanidis, The Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Analysis and 
Management, 2nd ed., The American Nuclear Society, La Grange Park, IL 
(1990). 
7. P. D. Wilson, The Nuclear Fuel Cycle: From Ore to Waste, Oxford University 
Press, New York, NY (1996). 
8. J. C. Mark, Explosive Properties of Reactor-Grade Plutonium, Science & 
Global Security, 4, 111-128 (1993). 
9. M. Benedict, T. H. Pigford, and H. W. Levi,  Nuclear Chemical Engineering,  
2nd Ed., McGraw-Hill Inc., New York, NY (1981).  
10. J. E. C. Hymans, “Theories of Nuclear Proliferation,” The Nonproliferation 
Review, 13, (3), 455-465 (2006). 
11. J. Cirincione, J. B. Wolfsthal, and M. Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, 
Biological and Chemical Threats, 2nd Ed., Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, Washington, DC (2005). 
  
96
12. J. E. C. Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, UK (2006). 
13. R. J. Einhorn, “Identifiying Nuclear Aspirants and Their Pathways to the 
Bomb,” The Nonproliferation Review, 13, (3), 491-499 (2006). 
14. K. M. Campbell, R. J. Einhorn, and M. B. Reiss, The Nuclear Tipping Point: 
Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices, Brookings Institution Press, 
Washington, DC (2004). 
15. A. Kadhim, “The Future of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East,” The 
Nonproliferation Review, 13, (3), 582-587 (2006). 
16. P.R. Lavoy and R. Walker, “Conference Report: Nuclear Weapons 
Proliferation: 2016,” Monterey, California July 28-29, (2006); available on the 
Internet at (http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/events/recent/NuclearWeaponsProlifer 
ation2016Jul06_rpt.asp). 
17. D. G. Ford Jr., “Assessment Tool for Nuclear Material Acquisition Pathways,” 
M. S. Thesis, Nuclear Engineering, Texas A&M University, College Station, 
TX (2008). 
18. W. Epstein. “Why States Go—and Don’t Go—Nuclear,” ANNALS of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 430, (1), 16-28 (1977). 
19. T. Greenwood, Nuclear Proliferation: Motivation, Capabilities, and Strategies 
for Control, McGraw-Hill Inc, New York, NY (1977). 
20. Office of Technology Assessment, “Nuclear Proliferation and Safeguards,” 
Praeger Publishing, New York, NY (1977); available on the Internet at 
(http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ota/Ota_5/DATA/1977/7705.PDF).   
21. S. Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation, The University of Chicago, 
Chicago, IL (1984). 
22. C. Ferguson and W. Potter, The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism, Center for 
Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey, CA (2004). 
23. Statement to the Fifty-First Regular Session of the IAEA General Conference 
2007 by IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, (viewed March 
2008); available on the Internet at  (http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/ 
Statements/2007/ebsp2007n014.html). 
24. “Evaluation Methodology for Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection 
of Generation IV Nuclear Energy Systems,” OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, 
  
97
Washington, DC (2006); available on the Internet at (http://www.gen-
4.org/Technology/horizontal/PRPPEM.pdf).   
25. H. Matsuoka, Y. Nishiwaki, A. Ryjov, and A. Belenki, “An Evaluation Method 
on the Integrated Safeguards Based on Fuzzy Theory,” Information Sciences, 
142, 131-150 (2002). 
26. W. Edwards, R. T. Miles and D. Winterfeldt, Advances in Decision Analysis: 
From Foundations to Applications, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
New York (2007). 
27. M. Kelly and M. C. Thorn, “An Approach to Multi-Attribute Utility Analysis 
Under Parametric Uncertainty,” Annals of Nuclear Energy, 28, (9), 875-893 
(2001). 
28. M. Danielson, L. Ekenberg, J. Johansson, and A. Larsson, “Decision Analysis 
with Multiple Objectives in a Framework for Evaluating Imprecision,” 
International Journal of Uncertainty, Fuzziness & Knowledge-Based Systems, 
13, (5), 495-509 (2005). 
29. E. Cabrera and N. Raju, “Utility Analysis: Current Trends and Future 
Directions,” International Journal of Selection & Assessment, 9, (1) 98-102 
(2001). 
30. E. Gartzke and D. Jo, “Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation,” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 51, (1) 167-194 (2007). 
31. K. Miller, Conversations at Los Alamos National Laboratory, Summer 2006. 
32. T. Bayes, Facsimilies of Two Papers by Bayes, I. An essay toward solving a 
problem in the doctrine of chances. II. A letter on asymptotic series from Bayes 
to John Canton, Hafner Publishing Co., New York, NY (1963). 
33. B. Carlin and T. Louis, Bayes and Empirical Bayes Methods for Data Analysis, 
Chapman & Hall, New York, NY (1996). 
34. W. Bolstad, Introduction to Bayesian Statistics, 2nd ed., John Wiley & Sons 
Inc., Hoboken, NJ, (2007). 
35. Netica, Bayesian Network Software, Norsys Software Corp; available on the 
Internet at (http://www.norsys.com/). 
 
 
  
98
APPENDIX A 
VALUES OF miν  USED FOR DELIVERABILITY INTENTIONS 
The figures in appendix A give all of the values of miν  that are used to calculate 
the deliverability intentions for each motivation considered in this work. 
Deliverability ν i
m
Non-Deliverable 0.8
Truck/Cargo Container 1
Air Drop 0.2
Mirv-Warhead 0.05
Artillery Shell 0.05
Suitcase Bomb 0.05
Prestige of Possession
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Non-
Deliverable
Truck/Cargo
Container
Air Drop Mirv-
Warhead
Artillery Shell Suitcase
Bomb  
Fig. A-1. Values of miν  used for prestige of possession 
Deliverability ν i
m
Non-Deliverable 0
Truck/Cargo Container 0.8
Air Drop 1
Mirv-Warhead 0.1
Artillery Shell 0.05
Suitcase Bomb 0.05
Prestige of Capabilities (non peaceful)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Non-
Deliverable
Truck/Cargo
Container
Air Drop Mirv-
Warhead
Artillery Shell Suitcase
Bomb  
Fig. A-2. Values of miν  used for prestige of capabilities (non peaceful)  
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Deliverability ν i
m
Non-Deliverable 1
Truck/Cargo Container 0.8
Air Drop 0.2
Mirv-Warhead 0.05
Artillery Shell 0.05
Suitcase Bomb 0.05
Prestige of Capabilities (peaceful demonstration)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Non-
Deliverable
Truck/Cargo
Container
Air Drop Mirv-
Warhead
Artillery Shell Suitcase
Bomb  
Fig. A-3. Values of miν  used for prestige of capabilities (peaceful demonstration)  
Deliverability ν i
m
Non-Deliverable 0.05
Truck/Cargo Container 0.4
Air Drop 1
Mirv-Warhead 0.4
Artillery Shell 0.05
Suitcase Bomb 0.05
Manipulate Adversaries
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Non-
Deliverable
Truck/Cargo
Container
Air Drop Mirv-
Warhead
Artillery Shell Suitcase
Bomb  
Fig. A-4. Values of miν  used for manipulate adversaries  
Deliverability ν i
m
Non-Deliverable 0.2
Truck/Cargo Container 1
Air Drop 0.3
Mirv-Warhead 0.05
Artillery Shell 0.05
Suitcase Bomb 0.05
Apocalyptic Beliefs
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Non-
Deliverable
Truck/Cargo
Container
Air Drop Mirv-
Warhead
Artillery Shell Suitcase
Bomb  
Fig. A-5. Values of miν  used for apocalyptic beliefs  
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Deliverability ν i
m
Non-Deliverable 0.3
Truck/Cargo Container 1
Air Drop 0.05
Mirv-Warhead 0.05
Artillery Shell 0.05
Suitcase Bomb 0.05
Religious Duty
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Non-
Deliverable
Truck/Cargo
Container
Air Drop Mirv-
Warhead
Artillery Shell Suitcase
Bomb  
Fig. A-6. Values of miν  used for religious duty  
Deliverability ν i
m
Non-Deliverable 0.5
Truck/Cargo Container 7
Air Drop 0.2
Mirv-Warhead 0.05
Artillery Shell 0.05
Suitcase Bomb 0.05
Psychological Warfare (non use)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Non-
Deliverable
Truck/Cargo
Container
Air Drop Mirv-
Warhead
Artillery Shell Suitcase
Bomb  
Fig. A-7. Values of miν  used for psychological warfare (non use)  
Deliverability ν i
m
Non-Deliverable 0
Truck/Cargo Container 1
Air Drop 0.6
Mirv-Warhead 0.2
Artillery Shell 0.05
Suitcase Bomb 0.05
Psychological Warfare (intended use)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Non-
Deliverable
Truck/Cargo
Container
Air Drop Mirv-
Warhead
Artillery Shell Suitcase
Bomb  
Fig. A-8. Values of miν  used for psychological warfare (intended use) 
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Deliverability ν i
m
Non-Deliverable 0.05
Truck/Cargo Container 1
Air Drop 0.4
Mirv-Warhead 0.05
Artillery Shell 0.05
Suitcase Bomb 0.05
War on Own Nation (Separatist)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Non-
Deliverable
Truck/Cargo
Container
Air Drop Mirv-
Warhead
Artillery Shell Suitcase
Bomb  
Fig. A-9. Values of miν  used for war on own nation (Separatist)  
Deliverability ν i
m
Non-Deliverable 0
Truck/Cargo Container 1
Air Drop 0.8
Mirv-Warhead 0.05
Artillery Shell 0.05
Suitcase Bomb 0.05
War on Another Nation (Extremist)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Non-
Deliverable
Truck/Cargo
Container
Air Drop Mirv-
Warhead
Artillery Shell Suitcase
Bomb  
Fig. A-10. Values of miν  used for war on another nation (Extremist)  
Deliverability ν i
m
Non-Deliverable 0
Truck/Cargo Container 0.2
Air Drop 1
Mirv-Warhead 0.8
Artillery Shell 0.05
Suitcase Bomb 0.05
Deter Attack from Nuclear Adversary
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Non-
Deliverable
Truck/Cargo
Container
Air Drop Mirv-
Warhead
Artillery Shell Suitcase
Bomb  
Fig. A-11. Values of miν  used for deter attack from nuclear adversary  
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Deliverability ν i
m
Non-Deliverable 0
Truck/Cargo Container 0
Air Drop 0.2
Mirv-Warhead 1
Artillery Shell 0.4
Suitcase Bomb 0.05
Seek Military Superiority
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Non-
Deliverable
Truck/Cargo
Container
Air Drop Mirv-
Warhead
Artillery Shell Suitcase
Bomb  
Fig. A-12. Values of miν  used for seek military superiority  
Deliverability ν i
m
Non-Deliverable 0
Truck/Cargo Container 0.05
Air Drop 0.8
Mirv-Warhead 1
Artillery Shell 0.2
Suitcase Bomb 0.05
Redress Conventional Military Asymmetry
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Non-
Deliverable
Truck/Cargo
Container
Air Drop Mirv-
Warhead
Artillery Shell Suitcase
Bomb  
Fig. A-13. Values of miν  used for redress conventional military asymmetry  
Deliverability ν i
m
Non-Deliverable 1
Truck/Cargo Container 0.2
Air Drop 0.05
Mirv-Warhead 0.05
Artillery Shell 0.05
Suitcase Bomb 0.05
Go Nuclear Before Rival
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Non-
Deliverable
Truck/Cargo
Container
Air Drop Mirv-
Warhead
Artillery Shell Suitcase
Bomb  
Fig. A-14. Values of miν  used for go nuclear before rival  
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Deliverability ν i
m
Non-Deliverable 0.2
Truck/Cargo Container 0.6
Air Drop 1
Mirv-Warhead 0.2
Artillery Shell 0.05
Suitcase Bomb 0.05
Intimidate Non-Nuclear Rivals
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Non-
Deliverable
Truck/Cargo
Container
Air Drop Mirv-
Warhead
Artillery Shell Suitcase
Bomb  
Fig. A-15. Values of miν  used for intimidate non-nuclear rivals  
Deliverability ν i
m
Non-Deliverable 0.5
Truck/Cargo Container 1
Air Drop 1
Mirv-Warhead 0.2
Artillery Shell 0.05
Suitcase Bomb 0.05
Acquire Position in International Forums
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Non-
Deliverable
Truck/Cargo
Container
Air Drop Mirv-
Warhead
Artillery Shell Suitcase
Bomb  
Fig. A-16. Values of miν  used for acquire position in international forums  
Deliverability ν i
m
Non-Deliverable 0.05
Truck/Cargo Container 0.05
Air Drop 0.8
Mirv-Warhead 1
Artillery Shell 0.4
Suitcase Bomb 0.05
Rise to Global Power Status
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Non-
Deliverable
Truck/Cargo
Container
Air Drop Mirv-
Warhead
Artillery Shell Suitcase
Bomb  
Fig. A-17. Values of miν  used for rise to global power status  
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Deliverability ν i
m
Non-Deliverable 0.2
Truck/Cargo Container 0.6
Air Drop 1
Mirv-Warhead 0.4
Artillery Shell 0.05
Suitcase Bomb 0.05
Enhance International Status
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Non-
Deliverable
Truck/Cargo
Container
Air Drop Mirv-
Warhead
Artillery Shell Suitcase
Bomb  
Fig. A-18. Values of miν  used for enhance international status  
Deliverability ν i
m
Non-Deliverable 0.5
Truck/Cargo Container 1
Air Drop 0.4
Mirv-Warhead 0.05
Artillery Shell 0.05
Suitcase Bomb 0.05
Demonstrate National Viability
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Non-
Deliverable
Truck/Cargo
Container
Air Drop Mirv-
Warhead
Artillery Shell Suitcase
Bomb  
Fig. A-19. Values of miν  used for demonstrate national viability  
Deliverability ν i
m
Non-Deliverable 0
Truck/Cargo Container 0.4
Air Drop 1
Mirv-Warhead 0.2
Artillery Shell 0.05
Suitcase Bomb 0.05
Assert Military/Political Independence
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Non-
Deliverable
Truck/Cargo
Container
Air Drop Mirv-
Warhead
Artillery Shell Suitcase
Bomb  
Fig. A-20. Values of miν  used for assert military/political independence  
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Deliverability ν i
m
Non-Deliverable 1
Truck/Cargo Container 0.05
Air Drop 0.05
Mirv-Warhead 0.05
Artillery Shell 0.05
Suitcase Bomb 0.05
Divert Domestic Attention
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Non-
Deliverable
Truck/Cargo
Container
Air Drop Mirv-
Warhead
Artillery Shell Suitcase
Bomb  
Fig. A-21. Values of miν  used for divert domestic attention  
Deliverability ν i
m
Non-Deliverable 0.05
Truck/Cargo Container 0.4
Air Drop 0.8
Mirv-Warhead 1
Artillery Shell 0.2
Suitcase Bomb 0.05
Enhance Bargaining Position Within an Alliance
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Non-
Deliverable
Truck/Cargo
Container
Air Drop Mirv-
Warhead
Artillery Shell Suitcase
Bomb  
Fig. A-22. Values of miν  used enhance bargaining position within an alliance  
Deliverability ν i
m
Non-Deliverable 0
Truck/Cargo Container 0.2
Air Drop 1
Mirv-Warhead 0.6
Artillery Shell 0.05
Suitcase Bomb 0.05
Deter Regional Intervention by Superpower
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Non-
Deliverable
Truck/Cargo
Container
Air Drop Mirv-
Warhead
Artillery Shell Suitcase
Bomb  
Fig. A-23. Values of miν  used deter regional intervention by superpower  
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Deliverability ν i
m
Non-Deliverable 0
Truck/Cargo Container 0.05
Air Drop 0.2
Mirv-Warhead 1
Artillery Shell 0.6
Suitcase Bomb 0.05
Increase Military/Scientific Morale
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Non-
Deliverable
Truck/Cargo
Container
Air Drop Mirv-
Warhead
Artillery Shell Suitcase
Bomb  
Fig. A-24. Values of miν  used for increase military/scientific morale  
Deliverability ν i
m
Non-Deliverable 1
Truck/Cargo Container 0.2
Air Drop 0.05
Mirv-Warhead 0.05
Artillery Shell 0.05
Suitcase Bomb 0.05
Increase Domestic Morale
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Non-
Deliverable
Truck/Cargo
Container
Air Drop Mirv-
Warhead
Artillery Shell Suitcase
Bomb  
Fig. A-25. Values of miν  used for increase domestic morale  
Deliverability ν i
m
Non-Deliverable 0
Truck/Cargo Container 0.05
Air Drop 0.8
Mirv-Warhead 1
Artillery Shell 0.2
Suitcase Bomb 0.05
Reduce Economic Defense Burden
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
Non-
Deliverable
Truck/Cargo
Container
Air Drop Mirv-
Warhead
Artillery Shell Suitcase
Bomb  
Fig. A-26. Values of miν  used for reduce economic defense burden 
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APPENDIX B 
VALUES OF miν  USED FOR YIELD INTENTIONS 
The figures in appendix B give all of the values of miν  that are used to calculate 
the yield intentions for each motivation considered in this work. 
Yield ν i
m
0.1 - 1kT 0.05
1 - 10kT 1
10 - 20kT 0.2
20 - 150kT 0.05
0.15 - 1MT 0.05
1 - 10MT 0.05
Prestige of Possession
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
0.1 - 1kT 1 - 10kT 10 - 20kT 20 - 150kT 0.15 - 1MT 1 - 10MT  
Fig. B-1. Values of miν  used for prestige of possession  
Yield ν i
m
0.1 - 1kT 0.05
1 - 10kT 0.3
10 - 20kT 1
20 - 150kT 0.2
0.15 - 1MT 0.05
1 - 10MT 0.05
Prestige of Capabilities (non peaceful)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
0.1 - 1kT 1 - 10kT 10 - 20kT 20 - 150kT 0.15 - 1MT 1 - 10MT  
Fig. B-2. Values of miν  used for prestige of capabilities (non peaceful)  
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Yield ν i
m
0.1 - 1kT 0.05
1 - 10kT 1
10 - 20kT 0.6
20 - 150kT 0.05
0.15 - 1MT 0
1 - 10MT 0
Prestige of Capabilities (peaceful demonstration)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
0.1 - 1kT 1 - 10kT 10 - 20kT 20 - 150kT 0.15 - 1MT 1 - 10MT  
Fig. B-3. Values of miν  used for prestige of capabilities (peaceful demonstration)  
Yield ν i
m
0.1 - 1kT 0.05
1 - 10kT 1
10 - 20kT 0.3
20 - 150kT 0.05
0.15 - 1MT 0.05
1 - 10MT 0.05
Manipulate Adversaries
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
0.1 - 1kT 1 - 10kT 10 - 20kT 20 - 150kT 0.15 - 1MT 1 - 10MT  
Fig. B-4. Values of miν  used for manipulate adversaries  
Yield ν i
m
0.1 - 1kT 0.05
1 - 10kT 1
10 - 20kT 0.05
20 - 150kT 0.05
0.15 - 1MT 0.05
1 - 10MT 0.05
Apocalyptic Beliefs
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
0.1 - 1kT 1 - 10kT 10 - 20kT 20 - 150kT 0.15 - 1MT 1 - 10MT  
Fig. B-5. Values of miν  used for apocalyptic beliefs  
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Yield ν i
m
0.1 - 1kT 0.05
1 - 10kT 1
10 - 20kT 0.05
20 - 150kT 0.05
0.15 - 1MT 0.05
1 - 10MT 0.05
Religious Duty
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
0.1 - 1kT 1 - 10kT 10 - 20kT 20 - 150kT 0.15 - 1MT 1 - 10MT  
Fig. B-6. Values of miν  used for religious duty  
Yield ν i
m
0.1 - 1kT 0.05
1 - 10kT 1
10 - 20kT 0.4
20 - 150kT 0.05
0.15 - 1MT 0.05
1 - 10MT 0.05
Psychological Warfare (non use)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
0.1 - 1kT 1 - 10kT 10 - 20kT 20 - 150kT 0.15 - 1MT 1 - 10MT  
Fig. B-7. Values of miν  used for psychological warfare (non use)  
Yield ν i
m
0.1 - 1kT 0.05
1 - 10kT 0.7
10 - 20kT 1
20 - 150kT 0.4
0.15 - 1MT 0.05
1 - 10MT 0.05
Psychological Warfare (intended use)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
0.1 - 1kT 1 - 10kT 10 - 20kT 20 - 150kT 0.15 - 1MT 1 - 10MT  
Fig. B-8. Values of miν  used for psychological warfare (intended use) 
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Yield ν i
m
0.1 - 1kT 1
1 - 10kT 0.6
10 - 20kT 0.05
20 - 150kT 0.05
0.15 - 1MT 0
1 - 10MT 0
War on Own Nation (Separatist)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
0.1 - 1kT 1 - 10kT 10 - 20kT 20 - 150kT 0.15 - 1MT 1 - 10MT  
Fig. B-9. Values of miν  used for war on own nation (Separatist)  
Yield ν i
m
0.1 - 1kT 0.05
1 - 10kT 0.7
10 - 20kT 1
20 - 150kT 0.4
0.15 - 1MT 0.05
1 - 10MT 0.05
War on Another Nation (Extremist)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
0.1 - 1kT 1 - 10kT 10 - 20kT 20 - 150kT 0.15 - 1MT 1 - 10MT  
Fig. B-10. Values of miν  used for war on another nation (Extremist)  
Yield ν i
m
0.1 - 1kT 0.05
1 - 10kT 0.05
10 - 20kT 0.4
20 - 150kT 1
0.15 - 1MT 0.3
1 - 10MT 0.05
Deter Attack from Nuclear Adversary
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
0.1 - 1kT 1 - 10kT 10 - 20kT 20 - 150kT 0.15 - 1MT 1 - 10MT  
Fig. B-11. Values of miν  used for deter attack from nuclear adversary  
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Yield ν i
m
0.1 - 1kT 0.05
1 - 10kT 0.2
10 - 20kT 0.6
20 - 150kT 1
0.15 - 1MT 0.4
1 - 10MT 0.05
Seek Military Superiority
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
0.1 - 1kT 1 - 10kT 10 - 20kT 20 - 150kT 0.15 - 1MT 1 - 10MT  
Fig. B-12. Values of miν  used for seek military superiority  
Yield ν i
m
0.1 - 1kT 0.05
1 - 10kT 1
10 - 20kT 0.6
20 - 150kT 0.2
0.15 - 1MT 0.05
1 - 10MT 0.05
Redress Conventional Military Asymmetry
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
0.1 - 1kT 1 - 10kT 10 - 20kT 20 - 150kT 0.15 - 1MT 1 - 10MT  
Fig. B-13. Values of miν  used for redress conventional military asymmetry  
Yield ν i
m
0.1 - 1kT 0.05
1 - 10kT 1
10 - 20kT 0.05
20 - 150kT 0.05
0.15 - 1MT 0.05
1 - 10MT 0.05
Go Nuclear Before Rival
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
0.1 - 1kT 1 - 10kT 10 - 20kT 20 - 150kT 0.15 - 1MT 1 - 10MT  
Fig. B-14. Values of miν  used for go nuclear before rival  
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Yield ν i
m
0.1 - 1kT 0.05
1 - 10kT 1
10 - 20kT 0.4
20 - 150kT 0.05
0.15 - 1MT 0.05
1 - 10MT 0.05
Intimidate Non-Nuclear Rivals
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
0.1 - 1kT 1 - 10kT 10 - 20kT 20 - 150kT 0.15 - 1MT 1 - 10MT  
Fig. B-15. Values of miν  used for intimidate non-nuclear rivals  
Yield ν i
m
0.1 - 1kT 0.05
1 - 10kT 0.6
10 - 20kT 1
20 - 150kT 0.3
0.15 - 1MT 0.05
1 - 10MT 0.05
Acquire Position in International Forums
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
0.1 - 1kT 1 - 10kT 10 - 20kT 20 - 150kT 0.15 - 1MT 1 - 10MT  
Fig. B-16. Values of miν  used for acquire position in international forums  
Yield ν i
m
0.1 - 1kT 0.05
1 - 10kT 0.05
10 - 20kT 0.6
20 - 150kT 1
0.15 - 1MT 0.5
1 - 10MT 0.05
Rise to Global Power Status
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
0.1 - 1kT 1 - 10kT 10 - 20kT 20 - 150kT 0.15 - 1MT 1 - 10MT  
Fig. B-17. Values of miν  used for rise to global power status  
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Yield ν i
m
0.1 - 1kT 0.6
1 - 10kT 0.05
10 - 20kT 0.4
20 - 150kT 1
0.15 - 1MT 0.3
1 - 10MT 0.05
Enhance International Status
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
0.1 - 1kT 1 - 10kT 10 - 20kT 20 - 150kT 0.15 - 1MT 1 - 10MT  
Fig. B-18. Values of miν  used for enhance international status  
Yield ν i
m
0.1 - 1kT 0.05
1 - 10kT 0.8
10 - 20kT 1
20 - 150kT 0.2
0.15 - 1MT 0.05
1 - 10MT 0.05
Demonstrate National Viability
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
0.1 - 1kT 1 - 10kT 10 - 20kT 20 - 150kT 0.15 - 1MT 1 - 10MT  
Fig. B-19. Values of miν  used for demonstrate national viability  
Yield ν i
m
0.1 - 1kT 0.05
1 - 10kT 0.6
10 - 20kT 1
20 - 150kT 0.3
0.15 - 1MT 0.05
1 - 10MT 0.05
Assert Military/Political Independence
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
0.1 - 1kT 1 - 10kT 10 - 20kT 20 - 150kT 0.15 - 1MT 1 - 10MT  
Fig. B-20. Values of miν  used for assert military/political independence  
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Yield ν i
m
0.1 - 1kT 0.05
1 - 10kT 1
10 - 20kT 0.05
20 - 150kT 0.05
0.15 - 1MT 0.05
1 - 10MT 0.05
Divert Domestic Attention
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
0.1 - 1kT 1 - 10kT 10 - 20kT 20 - 150kT 0.15 - 1MT 1 - 10MT  
Fig. B-21. Values of miν  used for divert domestic attention  
Yield ν i
m
0.1 - 1kT 0.05
1 - 10kT 0.3
10 - 20kT 0.6
20 - 150kT 1
0.15 - 1MT 0.4
1 - 10MT 0.05
Enhance Bargaining Position Within an Alliance
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
0.1 - 1kT 1 - 10kT 10 - 20kT 20 - 150kT 0.15 - 1MT 1 - 10MT  
Fig. B-22. Values of miν  used enhance bargaining position within an alliance  
Yield ν i
m
0.1 - 1kT 0.05
1 - 10kT 0.4
10 - 20kT 1
20 - 150kT 0.2
0.15 - 1MT 0.05
1 - 10MT 0.05
Deter Regional Intervention by Superpower
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
0.1 - 1kT 1 - 10kT 10 - 20kT 20 - 150kT 0.15 - 1MT 1 - 10MT  
Fig. B-23. Values of miν  used deter regional intervention by superpower  
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Yield ν i
m
0.1 - 1kT 1
1 - 10kT 0.05
10 - 20kT 0.05
20 - 150kT 1
0.15 - 1MT 0.6
1 - 10MT 0.2
Increase Military/Scientific Morale
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
0.1 - 1kT 1 - 10kT 10 - 20kT 20 - 150kT 0.15 - 1MT 1 - 10MT  
Fig. B-24. Values of miν  used for increase military/scientific morale  
Yield ν i
m
0.1 - 1kT 0.05
1 - 10kT 1
10 - 20kT 0.3
20 - 150kT 0.05
0.15 - 1MT 0.05
1 - 10MT 0.05
Increase Domestic Morale
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
0.1 - 1kT 1 - 10kT 10 - 20kT 20 - 150kT 0.15 - 1MT 1 - 10MT  
Fig. B-25. Values of miν  used for increase domestic morale  
Yield ν i
m
0.1 - 1kT 0.05
1 - 10kT 0.6
10 - 20kT 1
20 - 150kT 0.4
0.15 - 1MT 0.05
1 - 10MT 0.05
Reduce Economic Defense Burden
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
0.1 - 1kT 1 - 10kT 10 - 20kT 20 - 150kT 0.15 - 1MT 1 - 10MT  
Fig. B-26. Values of miν  used for reduce economic defense burden 
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APPENDIX C 
VALUES OF miν  USED FOR NUMBER OF INTENDED DEVICES 
INTENTIONS 
The figures in appendix C give all of the values of miν  that are used to calculate 
the number of intended devices intentions for each motivation considered in this work. 
Intended # of Devices ν i
m
1 1
2 - 3 0.8
3 - 10 0.3
10 - 100 0.05
100 + 0.05
Prestige of Possession
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
1 2 - 3 3 - 10 10 - 100 100 +  
Fig. C-1. Values of miν  used for prestige of possession  
Intended # of Devices ν i
m
1 0.8
2 - 3 1
3 - 10 0.5
10 - 100 0.05
100 + 0.05
Prestige of Capabilities (non peaceful)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
1 2 - 3 3 - 10 10 - 100 100 +  
Fig. C-2. Values of miν  used for prestige of capabilities (non peaceful)  
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Intended # of Devices ν i
m
1 1
2 - 3 0.4
3 - 10 0.05
10 - 100 0.05
100 + 0.05
Prestige of Capabilities (peaceful demonstration)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
1 2 - 3 3 - 10 10 - 100 100 +  
Fig. C-3. Values of miν  used for prestige of capabilities (peaceful demonstration)  
Intended # of Devices ν i
m
1 1
2 - 3 0.7
3 - 10 0.2
10 - 100 0.05
100 + 0.05
Manipulate Adversaries
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
1 2 - 3 3 - 10 10 - 100 100 +  
Fig. C-4. Values of miν  used for manipulate adversaries  
Intended # of Devices ν i
m
1 1
2 - 3 0.5
3 - 10 0.05
10 - 100 0.05
100 + 0.05
Apocalyptic Beliefs
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
1 2 - 3 3 - 10 10 - 100 100 +  
Fig. C-5. Values of miν  used for apocalyptic beliefs  
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Intended # of Devices ν i
m
1 1
2 - 3 0.05
3 - 10 0.05
10 - 100 0.05
100 + 0.05
Religious Duty
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
1 2 - 3 3 - 10 10 - 100 100 +  
Fig. C-6. Values of miν  used for religious duty  
Intended # of Devices ν i
m
1 0.8
2 - 3 1
3 - 10 0.3
10 - 100 0.05
100 + 0.05
Psychological Warfare (non use)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
1 2 - 3 3 - 10 10 - 100 100 +  
Fig. C-7. Values of miν  used for psychological warfare (non use)  
Intended # of Devices ν i
m
1 0.5
2 - 3 1
3 - 10 0.4
10 - 100 0.05
100 + 0.05
Psychological Warfare (intended use)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
1 2 - 3 3 - 10 10 - 100 100 +  
Fig. C-8. Values of miν  used for psychological warfare (intended use) 
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Intended # of Devices ν i
m
1 1
2 - 3 0.6
3 - 10 0.2
10 - 100 0.05
100 + 0.05
War on Own Nation (Separatist)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
1 2 - 3 3 - 10 10 - 100 100 +  
Fig. C-9. Values of miν  used for war on own nation (Separatist)  
Intended # of Devices ν i
m
1 1
2 - 3 0.8
3 - 10 0.3
10 - 100 0.05
100 + 0.05
War on Another Nation (Extremist)
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
1 2 - 3 3 - 10 10 - 100 100 +  
Fig. C-10. Values of miν  used for war on another nation (Extremist)  
Intended # of Devices ν i
m
1 0.05
2 - 3 0.3
3 - 10 0.8
10 - 100 1
100 + 0.3
Deter Attack from Nuclear Adversary
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
1 2 - 3 3 - 10 10 - 100 100 +  
Fig. C-11. Values of miν  used for deter attack from nuclear adversary  
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Intended # of Devices ν i
m
1 0.05
2 - 3 0.4
3 - 10 1
10 - 100 0.6
100 + 0.2
Seek Military Superiority
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
1 2 - 3 3 - 10 10 - 100 100 +  
Fig. C-12. Values of miν  used for seek military superiority  
Intended # of Devices ν i
m
1 0.05
2 - 3 0.3
3 - 10 0.8
10 - 100 1
100 + 0.3
Redress Conventional Military Asymmetry
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
1 2 - 3 3 - 10 10 - 100 100 +  
Fig. C-13. Values of miν  used for redress conventional military asymmetry  
Intended # of Devices ν i
m
1 1
2 - 3 0.05
3 - 10 0.05
10 - 100 0.05
100 + 0.05
Go Nuclear Before Rival
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
1 2 - 3 3 - 10 10 - 100 100 +  
Fig. C-14. Values of miν  used for go nuclear before rival  
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Intended # of Devices ν i
m
1 0.4
2 - 3 1
3 - 10 0.8
10 - 100 0.3
100 + 0.05
Intimidate Non-Nuclear Rivals
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
1 2 - 3 3 - 10 10 - 100 100 +  
Fig. C-15. Values of miν  used for intimidate non-nuclear rivals  
Intended # of Devices ν i
m
1 0.2
2 - 3 0.6
3 - 10 1
10 - 100 0.8
100 + 0.3
Acquire Position in International Forums
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
1 2 - 3 3 - 10 10 - 100 100 +  
Fig. C-16. Values of miν  used for acquire position in international forums  
Intended # of Devices ν i
m
1 0.05
2 - 3 0.3
3 - 10 0.8
10 - 100 1
100 + 0.2
Rise to Global Power Status
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
1 2 - 3 3 - 10 10 - 100 100 +  
Fig. C-17. Values of miν  used for rise to global power status  
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Intended # of Devices ν i
m
1 0.4
2 - 3 0.8
3 - 10 1
10 - 100 0.4
100 + 0.05
Enhance International Status
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
1 2 - 3 3 - 10 10 - 100 100 +  
Fig. C-18. Values of miν  used for enhance international status  
Intended # of Devices ν i
m
1 0.6
2 - 3 1
3 - 10 0.4
10 - 100 0.05
100 + 0.05
Demonstrate National Viability
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
1 2 - 3 3 - 10 10 - 100 100 +  
Fig. C-19. Values of miν  used for demonstrate national viability  
Intended # of Devices ν i
m
1 0.4
2 - 3 0.8
3 - 10 1
10 - 100 0.4
100 + 0.05
Assert Military/Political Independence
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
1 2 - 3 3 - 10 10 - 100 100 +  
Fig. C-20. Values of miν  used for assert military/political independence  
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Intended # of Devices ν i
m
1 1
2 - 3 0.3
3 - 10 0.05
10 - 100 0.05
100 + 0.05
Divert Domestic Attention
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
1 2 - 3 3 - 10 10 - 100 100 +  
Fig. C-21. Values of miν  used for divert domestic attention  
Intended # of Devices ν i
m
1 0.3
2 - 3 0.8
3 - 10 1
10 - 100 0.3
100 + 0.05
Enhance Bargaining Position Within an Alliance
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
1 2 - 3 3 - 10 10 - 100 100 +  
Fig. C-22. Values of miν  used enhance bargaining position within an alliance  
Intended # of Devices ν i
m
1 0.6
2 - 3 1
3 - 10 0.6
10 - 100 0.05
100 + 0.05
Deter Regional Intervention by Superpower
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
1 2 - 3 3 - 10 10 - 100 100 +  
Fig. C-23. Values of miν  used deter regional intervention by superpower  
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Intended # of Devices ν i
m
1 0.05
2 - 3 0.05
3 - 10 0.6
10 - 100 1
100 + 0.2
Increase Military/Scientific Morale
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
1 2 - 3 3 - 10 10 - 100 100 +  
Fig. C-24. Values of miν  used for increase military/scientific morale  
Intended # of Devices ν i
m
1 0.8
2 - 3 1
3 - 10 0.4
10 - 100 0.05
100 + 0.05
Increase Domestic Morale
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
1 2 - 3 3 - 10 10 - 100 100 +  
Fig. C-25. Values of miν  used for increase domestic morale  
Intended # of Devices ν i
m
1 0.05
2 - 3 0.05
3 - 10 0.4
10 - 100 1
100 + 0.4
Reduce Economic Defense Burden
0
0.25
0.5
0.75
1
1 2 - 3 3 - 10 10 - 100 100 +  
Fig. C-26. Values of miν  used for reduce economic defense burden 
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APPENDIX D 
VALUES OF miν  USED FOR SUSTAINABILITY INTENTION 
The table in appendix D gives all of the values of miν  that are used to calculate 
the sustainability intention for each motivation considered in this work. 
TABLE D-I 
Values of miν  for sustainability  
Sustainability ν i m
Prestige of Possession 0.05
Prestige of Capabilities (non peaceful) 0.3
Prestige of Capabilities (peaceful demonstration) 0.3
Manipulate Adversaries 0.05
Apocalyptic Beliefs 0.05
Religious Duty 0.05
Psychological Warfare (non use) 0.05
Psychological Warfare (intended use) 0.05
War on Own Nation (Separatist) 0.05
War on Another Nation (Extremist) 0.05
Deter Attack from Nuclear Adversary 0.8
Seek Military Superiority 1
Redress Conventional Military Asymmetry 0.8
Go Nuclear Before Rival 0.1
Intimidate Non-Nuclear Rivals 0.1
Acquire Position in International Forums 0.7
Rise to Global Power Status 0.9
Enhance International Status 0.8
Demonstrate National Viability 0.6
Assert Military/Political Independence 0.4
Divert Domestic Attention 0.1
Enhance Bargaining Position Within an Alliance 0.5
Deter Regional Intervention by Superpower 0.3
Increase Military/Scientific Morale 1
Increase Domestic Morale 0.8
Reduce Economic Defense Burden 1  
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